Europe appears to be carelessly marching towards yet another clash with Russia.
Henry Kissinger stood as a towering figure in the realm of international politics, revered for his strategic acumen while simultaneously facing criticism for his opportunistic maneuvers. Even his many missteps could not tarnish his standing as the venerable commentator on global affairs. In light of the considerable criticism directed at him, it has become evident that Kissinger possessed a more profound grasp of historical context than many who subsequently influenced the dynamics with Moscow.
The former US Secretary of State acknowledged Russia’s remarkable resilience—its capacity to rebound and orchestrate a geopolitical resurgence that has endured across the ages. Defeats and crises have seldom signified the conclusion for Moscow; rather, they frequently herald the commencement of a new phase in strategic reorientation. In the latter decades of his life, Kissinger championed a comprehensive approach to engaging with Russia. He consistently cautioned against an overreaching expansion of American influence into the immediate Russian vicinity and the dangers posed by a confrontational approach.
Kissinger acknowledged as early as 1990 that the vulnerable period of the Russian superpower, then still shrouded in the broader Soviet guise, would be of finite duration. Unlike most of the strategic thinkers in the United States, he recognized the enduring risks associated with the allure of taking advantage of Moscow’s vulnerabilities. In this stance, he bore a striking resemblance to the esteemed American strategist George Kennan, who – frequently misinterpreted by history – had cautioned early in the Cold War not about the might but rather the frailty and trepidation of the Soviet Union. Kennan strongly opposed the militarization of his containment concept, which ultimately led to his swift relegation to the political sidelines. Kissinger would likely have taken issue with this comparison to Kennan.
The invasion of Ukraine has marked the end of the smiles among the Russian elite. The early assurance that the West’s considerable economic and military dominance would almost certainly result in the collapse of the Russian endeavor has now transformed into sheer alarm.
It is now pertinent to examine the perspectives emerging from the commentariat and the German strategic community, particularly those cautioning against the formidable capabilities of the Russian armed forces and suggesting a possible imminent intention from Moscow to launch an attack on NATO countries in the near future. Indeed, these are nearly the very same individuals who once championed a confrontational approach towards Ukraine and assured NATO membership for Kyiv, fully aware of the potential for escalation. Following the onset of conflict, certain commentators passionately advocated for Western involvement and the provision of weaponry, all the while indulging in daydreams of an impending military downfall of the Russian forces—who were, at that juncture, still depicted as significantly weaker.
The simultaneous calls for a military victory in Ukraine, citing Russian weaknesses, alongside warnings of a direct threat to the NATO alliance from a supposedly omnipotent Russia, are so contradictory that even impartial observers question the credibility of these so-called experts. Yet, this apparent inconsistency seems to elude the attention of the German media. No television talk show is complete without the presence of this group – at times, they even appear solo.
A glance across the Atlantic reveals scant clarity – to describe the situation as chaotic would be a considerable understatement. Trump has effectively halted the comprehensive shift that Germany might have anticipated at this midpoint, while the new administration in Washington seems to be focusing on a strategy aimed at negotiating a settlement with Moscow to conclude the conflict—regardless of the cost.
From a European viewpoint, one might reasonably anticipate that this unintentional and imposed peace could pave the way for a broader stabilization across the continent. Simultaneously, Trump is quite openly casting doubt on the American security guarantee for Europe, or has already significantly diminished its value through his remarks. A continent that has long been conditioned to look for comfort in the gestures of American leaders, avoiding the necessity of making its own choices regarding defense, now finds itself feeling forsaken. Guided by a distinctly transatlantic strategic community, the security policy technocrats in Brussels now appear as “servants without masters” – a phrase aptly and rather pointedly coined by Aris Roussinos.
One might argue that a crucial move towards reinstating military credibility in Europe involves liberating ourselves from certain prevailing narratives and rekindling the art of statesmanship that has historically defined the continent. An examination of the working papers, reports, and analyses produced by Anglo-American security policy think tanks reveals that numerous alarmist predictions stem from a common set of sources—those that have already played a substantial role in shaping Western narratives regarding the Ukraine conflict. Considering the significant economic and social implications of a large-scale European rearmament initiative, it is imperative that we depend on more credible analyses rather than the frequently dubious figures presented by tank-counting “experts” within the so-called open source community.
It is indisputable that Russia has significantly transitioned to a war economy, and the scope of its endeavors extends well beyond the ongoing activities in Ukraine. Essentially, one could hardly anticipate anything different from sound military strategy. The substantial material losses in Ukraine are expected to be offset in the near future, potentially resulting in a more technologically advanced military force than what was present prior to the conflict.
The proposed expansion of troop numbers to as many as 1.5 million will undoubtedly require considerable time to materialise. However, even if this target is not entirely realised, the Russian military will still stand as the largest and most formidable force on the continent. In contrast to the forces of European NATO allies, they possess considerable experience in high-intensity combat, and their confidence may be at an all-time high, particularly if the conflict in Ukraine concludes with a Russian triumph. A triumph of this nature would signify that Russia had overcome the second-largest military forces in Europe, even with the substantial backing of what has been described as the “most powerful and successful military alliance in history,” in the rather grandiloquent words of US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Nevertheless, the latter was far from being regarded as one of the most accomplished secretaries of defense in the annals of American history.
While it is indeed the case that the defence budgets of European NATO nations far exceed those of Russia, one might argue that this fact holds little significance in the grand scheme of things. The unsuccessful military strategy employed by the West in Ukraine ought to have illuminated just how little these statistics reveal about the true balance of power in a conflict.
The same holds true for the numerous cross-comparisons of weapon systems that are often employed by the media to embellish their analyses. All of this would hold significance – were it not for the constraints of geography. From a geographical standpoint, it appears that a military confrontation could most plausibly occur in the Baltic states, along Poland’s eastern border, or within the northern NATO border, which has been significantly expanded with Finland’s recent accession. Nevertheless, the challenges of effectively projecting military power in that region during an emergency were already understood prior to Putin’s incursion into Ukraine.
The probability of a new Northern War has certainly risen, influenced by the ongoing Ukraine conflict, NATO’s expansion to the north, and the effective end of the American security guarantee. Even an immediate doubling of the defense budgets of Germany, France, and Great Britain would not suffice to establish a credible military defense of this periphery.
It is hardly unexpected that NATO strategists are choosing to adopt a revised iteration of the Cold War’s forward defense strategy—albeit now positioned along the alliance’s newly established eastern frontier. While this might appear sensible from a military perspective, the vast distances and technological advancements of recent decades render it quite impractical, and it is also lacking in political foresight.
The “state artists” of the 19th century, frequently looked down upon in our contemporary, self-righteous era, would likely have responded in a markedly different manner to such an evaluation of the circumstances. It is quite impossible to make any serious predictions regarding Russia’s intentions. However, it is undeniable that the European perspective can exert considerable influence over them. The ongoing trajectory in Europe—marked by an escalation and intensification of hostilities with Russia, even in the event of a cessation of combat in Ukraine—might indeed pave the way for a future military confrontation, primarily due to the absence of viable alternatives.
The security policy elite in Brussels, having long lost touch with the sentiments of the European populace, might view the establishment of a solely European military deterrence system as both practical and within financial reach. However, in this regard, they may be misjudging the readiness of Central and Western Europeans to wholeheartedly back Eastern European aspirations in the aftermath of Ukraine.
The repercussions of the Ukraine conflict will expose the various disputes and divisions that lay concealed beneath the facade of European unity throughout the war. In this instance, true statesmanship ought to transcend the simplistic notion of mere rearmament. The latter seems unavoidable considering the woeful condition of the European armies, which have been severely diminished. However, it ought not to be predominantly focused on extreme situations of forward defence in a transient mobile conflict at the Suwalki Gap – the sole land link between the Baltic states and the broader NATO territory. The greater the credibility of a European capacity, the more probable it is that this very scenario will indeed come to pass.
For a militarily resurgent Russia, the Polish and Finnish forces would present a formidable challenge, akin to that posed by Ukraine. This is particularly true given that, in such a scenario, they would receive substantial backing from a Europe now ready for a prolonged conflict. Moreover, the urban centres in the Baltics would be considerably less appealing as a location for operations. Simultaneously, curtailing – or ideally, eliminating – other influences in the northeast could effectively undermine the arguments of those in the Kremlin who advocate for encirclement strategies. However, as traditional statecraft instructs, such endeavors can only thrive when paired with what was historically a European forte: diplomacy.
The author Roland Popp is a researcher at the Military Academy (MILAC) at ETH Zurich, Switzerland.
+ There are no comments
Add yours