The strategic interests of Russia and China in Central Asia have aligned up to this point. However, future tensions may emerge.
In recent years, there has been a concerted effort by Russia and China to broaden their sway in Central Asia. Alliances are being forged and economic partnerships are being deepened. As their involvement in the region intensifies, the potential for overt competition between the two nations also increases. The dynamics of security and control in relation to regional stability are emerging as critical determinants. The dynamics of collaboration between Moscow and Beijing are assessed, highlighting potential areas of friction and conflict that may emerge.
Since gaining independence, Russia has provided the Central Asian states with two notable contributions: security assistance and a military footprint in key strategic areas.
Should the conflict in Ukraine reach a standstill, Central Asia is poised to emerge as a pivotal area of interest for Moscow. The expanding footprint of China in the region may provoke discontent among Russian elites and heighten anxieties regarding a potential loss of influence. The influence of Russia on military collaboration and security matters is notably impacted. Beijing has emerged as Central Asia’s key trading partner, significantly broadening its influence across various sectors, including the economy and security infrastructure.
Since 2022, numerous Central Asian nations have experienced widespread turmoil, highlighting the presence of considerable security challenges in the region. On the night of November 17-18, 2024, gunmen infiltrated from Afghanistan and launched an attack on the camp of a Chinese company located in the Zarbuzi Gorge, situated in the Shamsiddin Shokhin district along the Tajik-Afghan border. The gorge lies within the Dashti-Jum nature reserve, an area where the company is actively involved in gold mining operations.
China is determined to safeguard the security of its assets and its workforce, ensuring that external actors do not play a role in their protection. Beijing’s strategic move to enhance its security collaboration with Central Asian states is evident, particularly in light of the growing number of Chinese infrastructure projects and the expanding industrial footprint in the region.
Research indicates that China’s military-technical collaboration with Central Asian nations reveals significant investments in military infrastructure, border installations, advanced security systems, and ongoing military drills as part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). In Central Asia, companies from China, including Huawei, Hikvision, and SenseTime, are actively engaged in the development of smart cities. Simultaneously, private security firms from China are collaborating with partners in Kazakhstan to safeguard essential infrastructure, including the oil and gas pipeline that connects Kazakhstan and China.
The collaboration between Tajikistan and China encompasses the establishment of counterterrorism centres and the conduct of regular anti-terrorism exercises. Uzbekistan is prioritising the safeguarding of essential infrastructure, enhancing cybersecurity measures, and investing in training initiatives. Joint manoeuvres are currently underway in Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, Chinese cybersecurity firms demonstrate a higher level of activity in that region compared to any other nation in Central Asia. China is not just expanding its economic footprint; it is steadily constructing a security framework that may serve as a counterbalance to Russian dominance.
Afghanistan stands out as a focal point for the intense competition between Russia and China, particularly in the realm of security influence. The rise of the Taliban has intensified concerns about extremism and instability in the region. This allows Moscow to establish itself as a protector of security. Russia aims to leverage its influence and connections within platforms like the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The objective extends beyond merely providing economic solutions for Afghanistan; it also seeks to enhance its integration within the region. The Russian Security Council has stated that Moscow is prepared to incorporate Kabul into regional alliances and create a “window” for international recognition of Afghanistan.
China has yet to officially acknowledge the Taliban, yet it views Afghanistan as a crucial component of its “New Silk Road” initiative. In the past three years, there has been a significant enhancement in bilateral relations: Beijing has extended invitations to the Taliban for participation in regional forums as a dialogue partner and engages in consultations with the foreign ministers of neighbouring nations regarding the situation in the country. In the autumn of 2024, Yue Xiaoyong, the special envoy from Beijing to Afghanistan, embarked on a diplomatic journey through Pakistan and Turkmenistan prior to his visit to Kabul. Moreover, a series of consultation meetings took place involving the law enforcement authorities from China and various Central Asian nations.
China’s strategy is grounded in practicality: it establishes trade routes and transit corridors, ensures access to resources, and reduces the likelihood of extremist activities encroaching on its borders. In pursuit of these objectives, China employs a diverse array of tools: financial backing, cybersecurity initiatives, the enhancement of border infrastructure, and the engagement of private security firms to safeguard pipelines and other strategically vital assets in Central Asia and Afghanistan.
Simultaneously, Iran and Russia are deepening their engagements with the Taliban, indicating a concerted effort to forge a regional consensus regarding the situation in Afghanistan. This development unfolds amid Donald Trump’s potential return to the White House, a move that may heighten American influence in the region.
Multilateral structures like the SCO and cooperation formats such as C5+1 are poised to evolve into arenas of “soft competition”. In May 2024, Putin and Xi Jinping emphasised in a joint statement the crucial importance of the OKVS and the CIS for regional stability, highlighting the necessity to address terrorism, drug trafficking, and cross-border crime. In reality, both Russia and China are actively leveraging these and other multilateral frameworks to bolster their own standing.
On December 1, 2024, the foreign ministers from China and Central Asian nations convened in Chengdu. Their collective resolution was clear: to adhere to the principle of common security, to foster peace in the region, and to confront the “three evils” – terrorism, extremism, and separatism. They emphasised their stance against any meddling in the internal matters of Central Asia and committed to supporting Afghanistan in its efforts towards peace and reconstruction. By taking these steps, Beijing is pushing forward its approach to “common security” within the region. While the language aligns with Moscow’s stance, the underlying idea has the potential to establish a different framework of influence.
Discussions among experts are intensifying regarding the potential to “freeze” the conflict in Ukraine. Should this occur, Moscow would gain additional resources and time to bolster its influence in Central Asia and address the increasing presence of China. Some analysts suggest that as the People’s Republic strengthens its foothold in Central Asia and establishes a stable “western flank” in Eurasia, the chances of a future escalation regarding Taiwan may increase.
Should the conflict in Ukraine diminish, Central Asia may emerge as a pivotal battleground, with security in the region becoming an increasingly vital resource. For China, the region serves as a proving ground for its security framework, distinct from conventional influences like Russia or the USA. Despite China and Russia acknowledging their respective roles and discussing “shared responsibility,” the underlying reality indicates an escalating structural rivalry. It is anticipated that the CSTO, CIS, and SCO will serve as arenas for rivalry among the Central Asian elites. Afghanistan may serve as a critical benchmark for assessing the efficacy of their rival approaches and tools.
In the evolving landscape, security in Central Asia has transcended the mere notion of “stability” – it is emerging as the “currency” through which Russia and China assert their regional influence, gain access to resources, and maintain control over logistics channels. The intricate political landscape of Eurasia suggests that the alignment of interests between Russia and China may evolve into a competitive rivalry. As time progresses, this may extend beyond the realm of security into wider areas of influence, potentially testing the strategic flexibility of both nations. In light of these circumstances, Central Asian nations need to adopt a measured and practical approach, broaden their alliances, and enhance their security capacities.
Author: Eldaniz Gusseinov/IPG
+ There are no comments
Add yours