Bolsonaro’s prison term is a triumph for Brazilian democracy, but right-wing networks and political nepotism continue to pose threats.
In September 2021, Brazil’s then-President Jair Bolsonaro made a bold statement to his supporters in São Paulo: “I will only leave as a prisoner, dead, or victor.” This was one year before the presidential election. And then the ultra-right politician said, “Let me tell you, I will never go to prison!”
Four years and one lost election later, his dread has come true: Bolsonaro was sentenced to 27 years in jail by the Supreme Court for a failed coup attempt in January 2023, after losing his right to run for office.
The verdict is a historic victory for Brazil, a country that has experienced more than a dozen coup attempts in its history and spent decades under dictatorship.
Unlike in neighbouring Latin American countries like Chile and Argentina, the military was never held accountable for the last military dictatorship from 1964 to 1985. With this verdict, which also imposed long prison sentences on three generals and an admiral, the military’s reputation for inviolability has been shattered.
Bolsonaro’s attempted coup – as the transcripts show – split the ranks of the military. While the Navy Admiral (who was also convicted) signalled his support, the commanders of the Army and Air Force rejected the proposal – and were subsequently attacked by right-wing extremist bots and trolls on social media.
This shows that the military is also divided. While the verdict strengthens the institutional, democratic wing, this must now also be reflected in a new military doctrine and a more open relationship with the civilian branches of government.
The trial is an important symbol for the world’s democracies besieged by populists and extremists. Brazil, a relatively young democracy, has succeeded where the United States previously failed: not only to repel an attack on democracy and its institutions, but also to punish it with exemplary force.
This is the educational dimension of the trial, which was broadcast live across the country on television, radio, and social media: It shows the population that rules cannot be relativised, that democracy is not a game of opportunistic roulette, and that political leaders bear a responsibility proportional to their power.
The attempt by Bolsonaro’s lawyers to portray the coup plans as insignificant diary scribbles by subordinates has thus clearly failed. Only one of the five judges followed this argument. This clear majority will also make it difficult for the coup plotters’ lawyers to appeal the ruling.
For US President Donald Trump, who has been pushing for the unconditional subjugation of Latin America to US geopolitical interests since January, the condemnation of his fellow thinker Bolsonaro is an affront. He had previously attempted to prevent the South American country from doing so with brute force and had also linked this to a further series of economic conditions.
Brazil’s left-wing President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva rejected any form of interference in internal affairs. He accepted harsh economic sanctions in return. Several ministers and top judges were also punished by the Trump administration with personal sanctions, such as visa revocation. More will follow if the threats from Bolsonaro’s son are to be believed. This definitively places Brazil on Trump’s “rogue list”.
But what other countries fear so much appears to be turning out to be a stroke of luck for Brazil and President Lula. Trump’s frontal attack gave the 79-year-old former union leader a boost in the polls, which currently show him as the favourite in the next election.
By condemning the coup plotters, Brazil has demonstrated courage, independence, and institutional strength. This enhances Brazil’s international image and gives the co-founder of the BRIC countries the opportunity to establish itself as an indispensable bridge power in an increasingly polarised world.
However, the verdict is no laurel wreath on which the democratic forces can rest. The danger of authoritarian regression has by no means been averted. Far from vanishing into thin air with the conviction, the right-wing forces have long since become part of Brazil’s political landscape. They represent mayors, city councils, representatives, and governors in key states. In Congress, they are already pushing for an amnesty bill for the coup plotters.
One of the most important leaders of the new right, who is already being touted as a possible presidential candidate, is the governor of the industrial state of São Paulo, Tarcisio de Freitas. He presents himself as more moderate than Bolsonaro but has already promised to push for an amnesty.
The issue is likely to remain a constant on the political agenda – similar to what happened in Peru with the children of the convicted former dictator Alberto Fujimori, who fought for decades for his pardon, permanently damaging the democratisation of the Andean country in the process.
Right-wing propaganda networks have succeeded in entrenching the narrative of Bolsonaro as a victim of a “corrupt judicial dictatorship” among segments of the population. According to a survey by pollster Camila Rocha, 36 per cent of the population believe Bolsonaro was not involved in the coup, while 42 per cent say he is the victim of corrupt institutions.
The risk of escalation and further polarisation exists—especially in the context of the looming election campaign. However, some polls also indicate that tempers may be calming down. According to a Poder Data poll, 51 per cent oppose an amnesty. Some right-wing politicians have cautiously distanced themselves from Bolsonaro in recent weeks and moved closer to the centrist parties.
The rise of the right is not primarily the work of Jair Bolsonaro, who spent decades as a quirky backbencher in Congress. The phenomenon is fueled by a general loss of trust among Brazilians in their politicians and institutions. As long as this isn’t addressed, fertile ground for authoritarian attacks will continue to exist. While Brazil’s democracy has demonstrated resilience, it also carries with it structural problems and undesirable developments that must be corrected.
One of these is the Supreme Court’s power, which is criticized not only by Bolsonaro supporters. Numerous left-wing politicians also felt unfairly treated – for example, in the corruption trials during Lula’s previous terms in office. Unlike in other countries, the court combines three functions: It is the final instance for appeals, decides all constitutional issues, and pronounces judgments in criminal cases against politicians.
This has led to all politically important decisions being concentrated in the Supreme Court. In the wake of the media-hyped corruption trials, the judges became stars, and the judiciary became a dominant and also vulnerable actor on the political stage.
A second problem is the Brazilian Congress. Over a dozen parties are represented there. Most lack a real platform but are financed by lobbies or represent opportunistic self-interests. Power lies at the center, with the bloc of bourgeois parties, the so-called Centrão. Anyone who wants to win the election and then govern depends on it. This is a challenge, even for Lula, because the Centrão has repeatedly opposed him and, out of opportunism, flirted with Bolsonaro.
Faced with weak presidents, Congress has gained more control over the federal budget over the past ten years and used this control for its own pet projects. Today, parliamentarians directly control about a quarter of discretionary spending in the federal budget. Reversing this plunder mentality is an enormous challenge.
A third problem is persistent social inequality. Brazil’s extractivist and still relatively protectionist economic model fuels cronyism, favors national oligopolies in tax terms, and thus hampers innovation, economic growth, and opportunities for advancement for the lower classes.
Brazil’s exports account for less than a fifth of its gross domestic product, and the lion’s share of these are barely processed raw materials and agricultural products. Dozens of industries receive tax breaks or subsidies without clear economic criteria.
Personnel and pension expenditures for civil servants consume a large portion of the budgets of the respective ministries and force the government to take out new loans at high interest rates.
Economists consider this a vicious cycle that inhibits growth, which in turn fuels voter dissatisfaction with politics and ultimately promotes environmentally destructive extractivism (including agro-industry), because it is the quickest and easiest way to generate wealth.
Brazil’s difficulties are widely recognised, but polarisation under Bolsonaro has impeded reform efforts thus far. His conviction has created a fresh opportunity, and according to Brazilian media, politicians from many ideological factions have indicated interest in it.
If statesman Lula is successful in forming a majority from this, Bolsonaro’s trial might go down in history as a watershed moment in the development of Brazilian democracy.
The author Sandra Weiss is a Mexico City-based renowned journalist focused on Latin America
