Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger’s withdrawal from ECOWAS and the formation of the AES alliance threaten a West African trade war. As import tariffs rise and diplomacy fails, the region faces its worst economic and political crisis in 50 years.
By Zikora Ibeh/Nigeria
Next month, the Economic Community of West African nations (ECOWAS) will celebrate its 50th anniversary with three fewer member nations and risk the start of a trade war unless last-minute diplomatic efforts change the situation. Decades of work towards free trade and regional integration are in danger of being undone by the conflict.
Established in 1975, the 15-member alliance has been embroiled in a crisis of legitimacy since July 2023 as a result of how it has responded to the spate of military takeovers in the area.
Between 2020 and 2023, military juntas took control after elected governments were toppled in Mali (2020 and 2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and most recently, Niger (2023).
Encouraged by a surge of anti-Western sentiment in the area, the latter abandoned Western friends like France, the US, Germany, and the EU and sided with China and Russia instead.
However, latent anger among the population did not become an open schism until the July 2023 coup in Niger by the junta commanded by General Tchiani. As a result, the seceding republics of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger formed the Alliance of Sahel Republics (AES), a defence alliance.
The AES has rapidly grown into a significant regional rival since its debut on the West African scene, with its own goals for trade, economic, monetary, and cultural integration. Following the expiration of the one-year notice period, the three states formally announced their exit from ECOWAS at the end of January. The AES intends to establish an investment bank and currently has its own flag and passport.
The AES raised the possibility of a trade war at the end of March by imposing a 0.5 percent import charge on all commodities from ECOWAS states. The rule, which went into force right away, covers everything except humanitarian help. In the context of the Trade Liberalisation System (ETLS) and the shared investment strategy, it runs counter to ECOWAS’s objective of maintaining open borders and unrestricted trade with the withdrawn nations.
The AES justified the fee by claiming that it needed income to fund its operations. It’s hardly shocking that it took this action given its ongoing financial difficulties and inadequate administrative capabilities. Compared to long-term investments in export markets or other competitive advantages, import taxes are a measure that produces rapid returns.
However, they can also swiftly result in catastrophe. There is a chance that the situation would worsen if ECOWAS retaliates with countermeasures.
Food prices might rise across the area as a result of the new levy, which could also disrupt trade flows. Nonetheless, the AES states—which are among the world’s poorest—are probably going to be particularly heavily impacted.
They depend on commercial routes through the seaports of their southern ECOWAS neighbours, namely through Senegal, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire, because they are landlocked nations. Therefore, tariffs increase the cost of importing necessities like food. For instance, Nigeria, Niger’s third-largest economic partner after France and Mali, provides petroleum and power to the country. Recently, there have been recurring shortages there.
The existing substantial political, logistical, and structural barriers that impede the expansion of intra-African commerce and specifically the implementation of the African Free Commerce Area (AfCFTA), are made worse by the AES tariff. With 1.3 billion inhabitants, this is meant to become the largest free trade area in the world. It went into effect in 2021. But thus far, it hasn’t been that successful. The volume of intra-African commerce in 2023 was just $192.2, or 14.9% of all African international trade, according to the Commerce Data Monitor.
Whether the AES nations can be convinced to rejoin ECOWAS by July 2025, when the transition time provided upon their exit ends, will determine whether West Africa will ever resume free trade. The three nations make up roughly 8% of ECOWAS’s gross domestic output, more than half of its 446 million-person population, and more than half of its more than five million square kilometres of territory. The community is currently experiencing the worst crisis in its 50-year existence as a result of their exit.
This situation wasn’t unavoidable. Indeed, ECOWAS made a conscious decision to go directly towards it. Taking everything into account, the independence seems to be a cost of renunciating its original pledge of pan-Africanism and of the poor management of the Niger coup. When it was first established, ECOWAS stood for regional peace and stability, non-violence, solidarity, and collective independence.
However, the alliance deviated from these principles more and more throughout the years. The moral credibility of ECOWAS has been severely harmed by its superficial defence of democracy while also allowing authoritarian long-term leaders like Faure Gnassingbé in Togo.
The AES’s rhetoric is primarily focused on preserving state sovereignty and anti-imperialism. In doing so, the tri-state alliance is exacerbating ECOWAS’s legitimacy crisis and positioning itself as a credible alternative. However, the path of political polarisation and a potential tariff war inevitably lead to their shared downfall. Therefore, it is now all the more urgent that ECOWAS avoid retaliation and instead rely on diplomacy to defuse the tensions triggered by the AES’s import tariffs.
In fact, the impasse was first brought on by the very absence of diplomacy. If ECOWAS wishes to reinterpret its position as a regional force, it must now internalise this lesson. If this isn’t done, the bloc’s significance and influence may continue to decline during the ensuing half-century.
Source: IPG | Translated from German
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