Bangladesh Between Giants: The Dilemma of Nonalignment

In a move that is sending shockwaves through South Asia’s geopolitical landscape, Bangladesh’s interim leader Muhammad Yunus has sparked outrage in India and raised eyebrows globally after comments made during a four-day state visit to China — his first official international trip since taking office.

Yunus referred to India’s northeastern states, known as the “Seven Sisters”, as “landlocked” and highlighted Bangladesh’s unique access to the Bay of Bengal, suggesting his country could serve as a gateway to the sea for the region — particularly benefiting Chinese trade. His remarks, seen by many as diplomatically provocative, have been widely criticised in India, where officials condemned the statements as “offensive” and “strongly condemnable”.

Bangladesh as China’s Maritime Gateway?

“The seven states of eastern India are landlocked,” Yunus said during his China visit. “We [Bangladesh] are the only guardian of the ocean for all this region. This opens up a huge possibility for China.”

Analysts argue this rhetoric signals a growing tilt towards China, as Bangladesh positions itself as a critical node in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Experts believe Yunus’s pitch aligns with China’s broader “String of Pearls” strategy — a network of ports and infrastructure projects designed to expand its influence across the Indian Ocean and effectively encircle India.

Economic Necessity or Strategic Realignment?

Observers suggest Bangladesh’s pivot is fuelled by pressing economic needs. “This is more about economic survival,” said Assistant Professor Roger Leo of National Syatan University. Bangladesh has struggled with dwindling foreign reserves and punitive tariffs imposed by the Trump administration, including a 37% rate comparable to China’s. “Yunus needs China’s support to stabilise the economy and gain political footing,” Leo added.

China responded swiftly, pledging $2.1 billion in investments, including $400 million to modernise the Mongla Seaport and $350 million for economic zones in Chattogram. Military cooperation is also on the table, with reports of training facilities and a possible air base in Bangladesh’s northern Lalmonirhat district, just 60 kilometres from India’s vulnerable “chicken’s neck” — the Siliguri Corridor, a 22-kilometre-wide strip connecting mainland India to the northeast.

India Alarmed by Military Implications

Security analysts warn of serious implications. The proximity of Chinese-built facilities to the Siliguri Corridor — India’s strategic Achilles’ heel — heightens the risk of military escalation.

“Even infrastructure meant for trade can have dual-use military purposes,” explained Professor Taiong Shang of National Jong Jung University. “Airstrips and ports built by China can easily be converted for military use, especially in times of conflict.”

Indian concerns are not merely hypothetical. China has already offered to supply Bangladesh with 16 J-10C fighter jets, with Bangladeshi pilots reportedly receiving training in Chinese-built facilities.

A Delicate Dance Between Giants

Critics argue Yunus’s timing was especially inflammatory. His trip to Beijing coincided with Bangladesh’s 54th Independence Day — a moment traditionally commemorated with strong nods to India, whose military intervention in 1971 was instrumental in Bangladesh’s liberation from Pakistan.

“Choosing to be in China on such a symbolic day is a bold move,” said Leo. “It signals a shift in allegiance, even if not formally acknowledged.”

India, long a close ally of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, now finds itself facing a Bangladesh with cooler diplomatic ties. Hasina, who fled to India after mass protests in 2024, had maintained a generally pro-India stance, fostering decades of cooperation. With her departure, the bilateral relationship has become uncertain.

Regional Fallout and Taiwan Tensions

Bangladesh’s embrace of China goes beyond economic collaboration. A joint press release from Dhaka and Beijing reaffirmed Bangladesh’s commitment to the “One China” principle, explicitly stating that Taiwan is an “inalienable part of China’s territory” — rhetoric that experts warn could have grave international consequences.

“Such statements indirectly legitimise the use of force against Taiwan by labelling any Chinese invasion as a domestic issue,” said Professor Shang. “It’s a legal grey area China is actively exploiting.”

The Economist and Australia’s Lowy Institute have voiced concerns that South Asian nations, under economic duress, are signing onto language that could one day justify Chinese military aggression — undermining international law and weakening global efforts to deter conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

Balancing Act or Siding with Beijing?

Yunus’s defenders argue he is acting in Bangladesh’s best economic interest, leveraging China’s investments to boost development. But critics warn of the cost: diplomatic isolation from India, growing military dependency on Beijing, and potential entanglement in Sino-Indian rivalry.

“Small states often try to hedge between larger powers,” said Shang. “But in this case, Yunus may be leaning too far into China’s orbit, jeopardising Bangladesh’s traditional alliances.”

What’s Next for South Asia?

With Yunus reportedly seeking a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to reset ties, the coming months will test whether Bangladesh can walk the geopolitical tightrope — or if its deepening partnership with China will provoke a lasting rift with India.

For now, Bangladesh stands at a crossroads. The decisions made in Dhaka — and in Beijing and New Delhi — may redefine the balance of power in South Asia for years to come.

Source: Taiwan Talks