The most important questions about Germany’s most extensive mission abroad are being asked more often. It need an outsider’s point of view to provide light on possible next steps.
 |
| [German army sniper in Mali] |
There is a lot of pressure being put on blue helmet missions in the Global South: The temporary suspension of overflight rights for MINUSMA in Mali, street protests against MONUSCO in eastern Congo, and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine are all factors that are likely to reduce the political will in Europe to participate in foreign missions outside of Europe. This is especially likely to be the case given the fact that Russian mercenaries are aware of how to unsettle Western troop providers in a targeted manner with minimal effort. While the deployment in the Malian desert will tie up extra resources this year owing to the heightened security situation, military “high-value capabilities” are now also anticipated on NATO’s eastern flank. This is despite the fact that the security situation in the Malian desert has worsened. Government representatives in Mali or the Central African Republic, whose countries actually benefit from a stabilization of the missions, understand how to increase both their contentious domestic political legitimacy and their options for foreign policy at the same time through populist criticism of western engagement and through increased cooperation with Russia. This allows them to achieve a win-win situation. In addition, many political decision-makers in Europe are still presented with the pictures of the chaotic retreat from Kabul, where, despite the fact that there were never blue helmets, many of the lofty aims of international participation were manifestly unable to be realized.
The worldwide balance sheet of the peace missions authorized by the United Nations (UN) is well known: blue helmets save lives and establish the political space that is necessary for the upkeep of a peace that is often fragile. Humanitarian assistance is only feasible if there is security, and peace operations help the execution of peace accords. Blue helmets defend the civilian population in South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Congo, and Mali. Blue helmets also protect the civilian population in the Congo. Wherever there are blue helmets at work, the local people recognizes and values the contribution they make. The findings of a survey called “Mali-Mètre” conducted by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung make it abundantly evident that the vast majority of people in central Mali acknowledge MINUSMA for the humanitarian work that it does. Much while the humanitarian and security situation in those areas of operation is not improving at the moment, it is likely that things would be in an even more dire state if the blue helmets were not there. When the topic of peacekeeping operations is brought up in Germany, this counterfactual argument is often overlooked.
In spite of this record, peace operations that are required by the United Nations need to adapt to a new reality in order to function effectively in a multipolar global order. It is quite likely that in the relatively near future, both the political will in the governments of the Global North that contribute troops and the military and manpower capabilities that are available for large-scale stabilization operations in the Global South will shrink. It is appropriate to express regret about this development; but, a policy of complacency toward places whose humanitarian safety is dependent on peacekeeping operations would be inexcusably irresponsible. It is of the utmost importance to begin planning early on for how peacekeeping operations might be supported more effectively throughout the medium and long terms, even in the absence of our own soldiers. It is already quite probable that in a multipolar world, regional groups such as the African Union would take on a greater share of responsibility for governing their own regions.
Mali is a great illustration of why we need to have this conversation. The government of the country where Germany maintains its biggest diplomatic presence in the world is continuing to give mixed signals, which is adding fuel to the fire of growing concerns about the mission’s legitimacy. Other western countries who contributed troops have already pulled out, or they have plans to do so in the near future. As armed groups continue to gain land, the situation for the civilian population, both in terms of security and humanitarian aid, continues to deteriorate.
However, Germany continues to establish the circumstances for the delivery of humanitarian assistance via its participation in MINUSMA. Additionally, Germany supports a political transition while also protecting civilians. While doing so, you make a significant contribution to the consolidation of the United Nations and take on international responsibility in an area that is also strategically significant for Europe. This occurs as a result of your participation in the MINUSMA mission. But all of this is often overlooked throughout the discussion. What has been lacking from the discussion up to this point is a vision on how events may alternatively go in Mali. There is not an exit plan in place for the medium term.
The German participation in MINUSMA ought to be maintained so long as there are operational working relationships with the Malian military government and a transparent political transition plan. In addition, the German participation in MINUSMA ought to be complemented by a more realistic political target agreement. To this purpose, it is vital to create clearly defined political milestones to the government of Mali’s host country. These milestones must either permit ongoing German cooperation or, in the event that non-compliance occurs, necessitate a controlled deduction. Domestic political reforms, such as a new constitution, the offer of inclusive dialogue processes (which, by the way, are also open to armed actors who are willing to engage in dialogue), and the opening of political leeway for civil actors could be examples of such milestones on the path to the peaceful replacement of the junta. The elections that are scheduled to take place in 2024 are another component of this, but they are not sufficient on their own. A continuation of German participation in MINUSMA would require certain conditions to be met, including unimpeded troop rotations, an airport in Gao that is still accessible but is not under the control of Russian forces, and reliable overflight rights. However, these conditions alone would not be sufficient to ensure German participation in MINUSMA. At the same time, however, a medium-term support perspective for a peace mission in Mali without German and other European soldiers should also be developed in Berlin and Brussels. This will ensure that large portions of the country are not simply left to be controlled by armed groups, such as the Islamic State, which have connections there.
In light of the growing uncertainty surrounding the continuation of MINUSMA, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has recommended the establishment of a follow-up mission to Mali that would be headed by the African Union. It is possible that this is a response to the Malian government, which often depicts the mission as “neo-colonial,” despite the fact that two-thirds of the troop donors to MINUSMA are from African nations. Although it is not true, the perception that Westerners dominate MINUSMA is damaging to the mission’s legitimacy among the Malians.
Guterres has not provided any more specifics about his plan for Mali at this time. Two illustrative cases of AU-Mis The latest hybrid operation to be completed was UNAMID, which was stationed in the Darfur area of Sudan until the year 2020. In addition, the African Union has been leading the AMISOM (now ATMIS) mission in Somalia since 2007. You will first hear a lot of discontent and a demand for change if you speak to folks who were engaged in both operations. Concerns have been raised, first and foremost, over the uncoordinated participation in AMISOM of countries that are neighbors and which have significant interests of their own. The finance of AMISOM was not fully secured, and there was an excessive amount of bureaucracy between the African Union and the United Nations during UNAMID. These are or were concerns. In spite of all of the challenges, it is abundantly clear that missions that have a narrower mandate and greater regional participation will have a greater tendency to gain in importance in the event that the political will for stabilizing large-scale missions with comprehensive mandates decreases in the future.
In general, the African Union (co-)coordinatMissions can only be successful if they are integrated into processes of regional diplomacy and political confidence-building between the government, civilian population, and armed groups willing to engage in dialogue in the country of deployment. This is the only way that these missions can be successful. In addition to this, the accomplishment of peacekeeping operations is dependent on the degree to which they provide the impacted people with essential government services and, last but not least, have a view on their finance that can be planned. It is not apparent at this time if the African Union (AU) would be willing or able to participate in military operations in Mali. This would probably only be the case if there was substantial financial assistance from the Global North that could be planned for over a lengthy period of time. Another condition would be transparent coordination with the Malian government, a clear division of roles between the national army and AU-Mission, and the fact that the African Union does not rely solely on troops from neighboring countries with currently strained relations with the junta, but rather on troop contributors from all over Africa. In order for Europe to provide its support for such a mission, the preservation of human rights would need to be explicitly included into the mission’s mandate, and the perspectives of civil society would need to be taken into consideration.
Assuming that these conditions are satisfied, it is not inconceivable that an African Union mission could be tasked with the responsibility of securing the Malian capital and other regional centers, in addition to cooperating with the Malian army in its fight against jihadist groups in central Mali that refuse to engage in dialogue and terrorize the civilian population. This substantial component would also lessen the motivation for the Malian government to collaborate with Russia, which up to this point has been more likely to endanger rather than protect people. Russia has a history of acting more aggressively toward protecting civilians. At the same time, such a new mission would need to continue to facilitate humanitarian relief and provide space for confidence-building in order to increase the likelihood that political solutions would be found to the complicated local and national problems in Mali. Because players in the Sahel area are willing to employ violence across borders, it would be necessary for it to be accompanied by diplomacy that is coordinated inside the region. Previous counterterrorism operations in the Sahel did not have this level of political integration inside the African Union. They miscalculated that merely eliminating the heads of terrorist groups would be enough to bring about peace.
A new African Union mission may initially become active in parallel with MINUSMA in Mali. MINUSMA will continue to take on important tasks related to the political transition and securing the Algiers peace agreement with armed actors in northern Mali. A new African Union mission may initially become active in Mali. If such a mission were also equipped with the logistical skills necessary to do so, it may eventually be able to take over duty formerly held by MINUSMA. It would be more cost-effective for Germany and the EU to provide financial and logistical support to an African Union mission rather than send their own troops, so that the funds released could be invested in supporting regional diplomacy, integrated development cooperation, crisis prevention, and humanitarian aid, not the least of which would be in the strengthening of the African Union.
In any event, the continuation of strong political participation on the part of the German government in Mali would be necessary for an additional mission to be carried out by Africans. The fact that Russian players are now now becoming more engaged in this area is not the only reason why this participation in the Sahel region makes sense from a development and foreign policy viewpoint. On the one hand, the Sahel region continues to be of geostrategic importance because there is a risk of a state vacuum in the immediate vicinity of Europe, which is increasingly being controlled by violent actors whose activities are also expanding to the West African coastal states. Moreover, the Sahel region is geographically located in the middle of Africa. Above all else, responsibility rests with Europe for an area that is most at danger as a result of the climate catastrophe and that is also experiencing a humanitarian crisis that is being made worse by the worsening security situation.