The ruling class in Russia want to control what people post on social media. But they are having issues with Telegram and YouTube.
In the years before the invasion of Ukraine, there were already significant limitations on the internet in Russia, and the social media sphere in particular. Since then, as Freedom House outlines the evolution from 2021 to 2022, limitations in the online environment in Russia have become significantly more restrictive. The Russian government wants to give the pro-government, pro-war elements complete control over everything that many Russians in their country consume online.
Right at the start of the war, the blockage of Western social networks like Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram generated headlines across Central Europe. But in terms of news dissemination in Russia, Facebook and Twitter were really incidental. Younger Russians in particular are engaged in a significant debate about opinion formation that is taking place on other platforms and cannot be won by straightforward blocking tactics. Because the Russians will continue to utilize internet media despite all the forced meditation on a conservative "Russian world," an alternative program that complies with the government must also be developed and given breadth.
In Russia, YouTube, VK.com, Telegram, and Instagram have the biggest market shares and each reach between 40 and 70 percent of the country's population. These platforms stand apart from pure messaging applications like WhatsApp. Only the Russian VK.com was substantially governed by the government when the war started. The strong in Russia had a lot of work to "do" in order to remove undesirable, off-color information from social networks disseminated within their own nation and replace it with material that adhered to their ideological viewpoints.
On the Russian internet, video is just as common as it is in Central Europe. Over the past 20 years, the growth of more intricate online videos with in-depth material has been remarkably comparable to that in Germany. Local competitors, such the Russian RuTube, were first established alongside the YouTube subsidiary of Google, but they quickly lost relevance in light of the US giant's expanding market dominance.
Despite all the objections, official Russian organizations and pro-government video bloggers were finally compelled to utilize YouTube's broad appeal. According to a poll done in June 2022, 74 percent of Russians stated they had recently utilized YouTube, with political news programs being the most popular category. The US video gateway is necessary if you want to use videos to reach Russians online. For years, Russia has benefited more from political YouTube than Central Europe, especially the oppositional YouTube. Because of "state secrets" in some video productions, for instance, YouTube frequently disregarded pleas from Russian authorities to shut the website.
It was obvious that the Russian government would wish to end this opposing strength of thought in its own nation once war broke out and the authoritarian turn in Russia grew stronger with it. The pro-Kremlin tycoon Yevgeny Prigozhin stated in January of this year what many in the Russian authorities believe: "YouTube will be shut down soon. After the prohibition, everyone who is still actively using YouTube will be found and punished appropriately. Despite this, more than a year after the war began, Russia still has access to YouTube in its regular format. Why is it so difficult for Russia to destroy the US network online?
It is no surprise that YouTube has become one of the most popular video platforms in the Russian area. In terms of technology and capability, YouTube far outpaces its Russian rivals. Even the CEO of RuTube's competitor Gazprom-Media, Alexander Sharov, told the news website RBK in January that RuTube couldn't take the position of YouTube. He mentioned Google's continually improved user suggestions, which precisely account for their viewing preferences, as well as the vast, global selection of information on the platform.
Analysts continue to think that Russian authorities are committed to removing YouTube from the Russian market. According to the Russian-language version of Forbes, successful rival VK.com, for which online videos were previously simply a sideline, is already prepared to increase its video capacity the minute YouTube shuts down on the Russian network. Additionally, VK.com is attempting to steal well-known video bloggers from its US rival.
The Russian state authority is not abandoning its efforts as a result of the unsuccessful RuTube growth, but is instead betting on a different horse. Above all, the Kremlin gains from Russian YouTubers' inability to commercialize their content, or produce cash from advertisements. The financial foundation of independent channels is this commercialization.
The Kremlin administration continues to hold quite divergent views on the viability of a ban at this time, according to sources in the Latvian online publication Meduza. According to Meduza, Putin has been informed that "the lockdown is not advised at this time." Due to their continued immense influence, Russians will only become more interested in learning more about how to get through web filters, which will ultimately help rather than hurt other restricted material. The last word may not have been said yet, given that YouTube is progressively censoring Russian official channels like those of the Russian Federation Council or well-known TV propagandists.
In contrast to the German-speaking nations, Messenger Telegram first enjoyed a reputation in Russia as a liberal, non-governmental platform. Political channels with a broad audience existed in the past, particularly in the opposition region. In 2020, attempts by the Russian regulatory authorities to entirely restrict Telegram domestically failed due to the decentralized nature of the network. The beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine coincided with a circumstance that prevented Telegram from being added to the Kremlin's blacklist once more as a result. Following the initial anti-war demonstrations, there were claims that the Russian government had either hacked into opposition Telegram groups or that the company, which is now located in Dubai, was providing information from opposition organizations to Russian authorities.
Russian authorities did not, however, focus their efforts on stifling rival competition in order to control Telegram. Instead, there has been a counter-movement on Telegram since the start of the war in the shape of "military correspondents" and "Z-Fluencers," who support Russia and comment on military events in Ukraine in a pro-Russian way, including reporting from the front while embedded with Russian formations. The military blogger Vladlen Tatarskij, who was assassinated in an alleged assassination attempt in Saint Petersburg, is a notable case in this regard. His true name was Maxim Fomin, and he recently had over 560,000 Telegram followers.
In an environment where even the slightest online criticism of the war may result in lengthy prison terms, these z-fluencers are permitted to report with amazing candor on what is happening on the front lines and even to give tactical critique at the military's highest levels. Along with these new "military correspondents," there are also politicians who, via venomous threats and slogans, have amassed a sizable following on Telegram, such as the former prime minister Dmitry Medvedev and the president of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov. This is further made worse by state-affiliated businesses utilizing unethical tactics, such bots and phony groups.
Pro-government Russians are being drawn into the Telegram network by the Russian state, for instance via the numerous personal channels of well-known officials. All of these initiatives significantly increase the number of new, non-opposition Telegram members, tilting the balance of opinion in the Russian-speaking portion of the network. In February 2022, 9% of Russians said Telegram was their favourite news source, but by January 2023, 20% said the same, even as the network's opposition players were coming under growing pressure. In 2022, Telegram also surpassed the dominant WhatsApp in terms of data traffic for messaging apps.
The Russian state is luring pro-government Russians into the Telegram network, for example, through the various personal channels of well-known figures. All of these activities considerably boost the number of new, non-opposition Telegram users, tipping the network's political landscape in the Russian language. By January 2023, 20% of Russians claimed Telegram was their preferred news source, up from 9% in February 2022—and this was true even as the network's rivals came under increasing pressure. In terms of data traffic for messaging applications in 2022, Telegram also outperformed the market leader WhatsApp.
It is alarming to see how well the Russian government exploits web tools to stifle freedom online, just as it has done with "offline freedom" locally. However, one shouldn't have a negative outlook on the Russian information scene. because performers who are critical of the government and speak Russian are still active, either covertly or from outside. meduza mentions the development of a "second RuNET" that is unrestricted by the government. Telegram and YouTube continue to serve as a connection point for emigrant influencers and reestablished online publications in other countries. These will be attainable in Russia without any workarounds either permanently or for a longer length of time.
One of the responsibilities of European politics and society must be to aid these players in their struggle against a powerful foe by providing them with employment possibilities, entrance points for Russians who disagree, and organizational and financial support for their endeavors. The only way they can hold their own in the conflict of ideas with strong state structures and their financially supported "community" is in this way. Because everything they once created in Russia offline has been destroyed.
Source: Roland Bathon/IPG