Mexico's President Obrador longs for simpler times and greater control. For this, he wishes to restrain the independent electoral institution.
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| Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador |
Unlike Germany and many other nations, Mexico does not have an identity card. Various governments attempted to do the same, but they were met with hostility from a populace that does not trust those in power to handle data properly. As a result, the voter ID issued by the independent electoral institute INE and accompanied by a photograph, which has the same name in common language as the institute, serves as a replacement. To establish a bank account or sign a mobile phone contract, you must have a "INE." The document is also accepted as proof of identification by authorities and notaries.
Founded in 1990 as the Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE), the independent electoral institute represents the people's hard-won victory against their political elite, represented by the state Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which has ruled without interruption since 1929. The PRI had its own unions and bosses, as well as a specialized opposition that imitated plurality without being harmful. That is why Nobel Prize winner Mario Vargas Llosa referred it a "perfect dictatorship." This political supremacy, however, began to erode in the 1980s, paralleling rising diversity and societal heterogeneity. The PRI only won the election in 1988 because of a power outage during the count. The opposing candidate was still ahead before the darkness.
Aside from pressure from civil society, negotiations with the USA on a free trade agreement and negotiations to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Cooperation (OECD) also played a role. Both processes required modernization of state institutions, and the electoral institute was part of it, and its work was mandated. As a result, the PRI won yet again, but was discredited, weakened, and ultimately had to agree to the establishment of an independent electoral institute.
After going through many crises and undergoing reform in 2014, the INE, which oversees voting, is currently regarded as one of the most reputable organizations in the nation. In the previous nine years, it has staged 330 elections, including the most recent presidential election in 2018, which Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the left-wing nationalist collective group Morena won without a contest. The INE received harsh criticism for its inability to effectively combat money laundering in campaigns or stop violence against candidates, for instance.
However, none of these explanations are related to López Obrador's continuous criticism of INE. His arguments center on specific accusations made against the executive group. Their spokespeople are elite, dishonest, and avaricious. He has already made three attempts to limit the capabilities of the institution. The so-called Plan A was a constitutional amendment that included, among other things, electronic voting machines and streamlined plebiscites. It also reduced the membership of the institution and gave all of its members the right to vote. However, after several attempts by the ruling Morena party to coax or coerce specific opposition MPs in order to get the required two-thirds majority, the plan put out in April 2022 failed owing to unified opposition.
Plan B, which was introduced in November, portrayed itself as an administrative reform but would have drastically reduced the institute's budget, making it impossible to ensure the appropriate organization of elections owing to a staffing shortage. Despite being approved by Congress with an overwhelming majority of the ruling party, this straightforward administrative change was swiftly contested as being illegal and rejected by a judge through an injunction. Although the judicial authorities must still do the substantive examination, the change won't be put into effect until the general elections in 2024.
The administration also moved through with Plan C, which involved electing its supporters to the four positions that would be filled in turn. Typically, a committee has pre-screened a list of candidates for competency before the nomination is made before Congress. However, the lawmakers were unable to reach a consensus this time, thus the things beneath the 20 list spots were raffled off. Guadalupe Taddei won the president because Morena had nominated much more women than the opposition and because the Supreme Court had just ruled that a woman must lead the INE for equality's sake. She is from a family that Morenaconnected is quite close to. A second position was also achieved by Morena.
Massive public outcry in response to the President's moves against the INE gave life to an otherwise fragmented and uninspired opposition. In the course of the power battle, the president's popularity fluctuated between 64 and 55 percent, according to a Saba Consultores institute study. Congress and American think institutes raised concerns, and reputable media outlets like the New York Times regarded the attack on the INE as a threat to democracy.
As part of the free trade deal, the US government threatened punitive penalties and arbitration tribunals. Although it has been simmering for some years, the bilateral disagreement over GM corn and the growth of renewable energies that López Obrador halted is now increasing. This might harm Mexico's economy, which would hurt the prospects of the ruling party winning the 2024 election. Although López Obrador is still highly well-liked, the constitution's limit on reelection prevents him from running for office again. As a result, he has proposed three alleged successors, however it is questionable how much of his popularity he will be able to transmit to them, particularly in these trying economic times.
What makes him want to engage in a power battle with the INE now, when doing so puts his most significant trade partner at risk? This is due to three factors. One is private: López Obrador has spent his whole political career fighting the establishment. He started off as a regional politician in the PRI, which valued his approachability but frequently ignored him when it came to crucial personnel choices. He thus belonged to the faction that broke out and established the social-democratic PRD in 1989. He has a long history with the Social Democratic Party and believes he was the winner in the 2006 elections. He was then outnumbered by 250,000 votes, or a difference of 0.58 percent, according to the official count and recount. López Obrador never acknowledged his defeat and blamed it on the INE as the henchman of the business elite.
Secondly, there is a tactical one. Already during the most recent legislative elections in June 2021, there were hints of an electoral agreement between Morena and the Sinaloa cartel in exchange for impunity and efforts to free cartel leader Joaqun El Chapo Guzmán, who is now detained by the US. The claim that organized crime has access to party finance has also been made by party members, such as former party head Porfirio M. Ledo.The opposition is pressing the INE to enact stronger rules because of this. The proof was insufficient in 2021 for the election officials and courts to consider challenging the ballots. However, there are rising worries in the USA that Mexico might develop into a narco-state in the meantime. Republicans in the US Senate want to label the Mexican cartels as illegal.
The third is a tactical choice. The political program of López Obrador seeks to revive the one-party system while reclaiming state control over vital natural resources including lithium, energy, and oil. The President has identified "neoliberalism" as his nemesis. Neoliberalism weakened the PRI in the 1990s, allowing new players to benefit themselves while workers and peasants suffered from the effects of economic globalization. López Obrador considers himself to be the defender of these underprivileged groups.
Due to the loss of control, old and new interest groups engaged in violent battles, entwining their criminal, political, and economic objectives. Rafael Moreno Valle, a conservative ex-governor who later died in a helicopter accident and formed a coalition with the oil mafia, or the former PRI governors Javier and Cesar Duarte, who have since been imprisoned, and Humberto Moreira, who have ties to cartels made, are examples of this.
While mafia-political entanglements are not new to Mexico, they were concentrated under the PRI in the hands of the military and the interior ministry, which served a type of management role. López Obrador's security plan of "hugs instead of shots" is intended to revive this "pax narca," according to political advisor Rubén Aguilar.
This is important because López Obrador only trusts the military since, as he frequently emphasizes, it represents "the people" and not the ruling class. The military has evolved into a state inside a state that manages ports, airports, railroads, banks, grows trees, and deports migrants. According to one research, the military currently carries out 223 tasks, 100 of which are unrelated to maintaining the public's safety. Under López Obrador, he was given responsibility for little over half of such tasks. Between 2006 and 2021, the budget for the armed forces increased by 163 percent. At the same time, the military is de facto subjectno control. Human rights violations by the armed forces are rarely prosecuted, human rights activists who accompany such cases are spied on by the military, apparently without control, as recent publications such as the #GuacamayaLeaks show.
Democracy, pluralism, and independent institutions with control roles must be undermined in order to carry out this recentralization of authority and concurrent militarization under the cover of fighting drug trafficking. López Obrador followed this objective from the beginning, employing a methodical approach that resulted in the confrontation with the INE. He began by eliminating public funding for universities and civil society groups (such as childcare and migrant housing) and replacing them with direct financial social support, which the opposition accused as being condescending. In the meantime, 30 million people in Mexico are receiving social benefits that are unconditionally given out by party members and accompanied by party propaganda.
Top judges, the central bank, the money laundering bureau, and the attorney general's office are all packed with retainers for whom loyalty is the main factor. Even when it became clear that they were exploiting their positions for personal vengeance campaigns (general prosecutor) or were inappropriate (plagiarism of a judge's PhD thesis), his confidantes were not dismissed. This tactic is accompanied by persistent propaganda that breeds resentment and animosity and attempts to paint opponents, including journalists, judges, politicians, and scientists, as members of a corrupt system.
The adversary is attempting to counter it. She was able to deny Morena a two-thirds majority in the Congress in the midterm elections of 2021, making it hard for the president to rule. The opposition is diverse in terms of its programs, like Morena. However, the opposition, which runs from social democratic to right-wing conservative, continuously plays out thanks to Morena's influence and the possibility of positions. The opposition leadership's lack of replacement is another issue. Its stale, frequently dishonest politicians make López Obrador an easy target.
The function of a counterbalance is currently played by investigative media (like Latinus), civil society organizations like feminist groups or research institutions, and groups like the anti-corruption effort Mexicanos contra la corrupción y la impunidad. In the long term, however, they won't take the place of the work of a political opposition, even though they present a believable contrast to presidential propaganda in the public eye. By the elections in 2024, it is doubtful if this will have developed a coherent plan to combat the authoritarian restoration.
The author Sandra Weiss is a former diplomat and political scientist.