The Ukraine conflict highlights the Western Balkans' security danger. The EU is now contacting the residents, having become aware of the threat.
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| Western Balkan Countries[Photo: ZOOM] |
Policy toward the Western Balkans has shifted. This is seen by the high number of visits and political meetings in various formats in recent weeks and months. The primary cause for this is definitely Russia's conflict against Ukraine and the accompanying altered geopolitical picture of Southeast Europe.
The Western Balkans nations of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and North Macedonia were offered the obvious prospect of EU membership as early as 2003 in Thessaloniki. However, the promise has yet to be fulfilled. The EU-Western Balkans summit, attended by EU leaders of state and government and their equivalents, took held in Tirana, over 20 years after Thessaloniki on December 6th 2022, for the first time in a region capital.
Beyond the usual summit rhetoric, there were concrete decisions: cooperation in the energy sector, for example, a gradual elimination of roaming fees or financial aid with which "asylum and reception systems" and border protection should be strengthened - in other words, irregular migration should be restricted.
The joint final declaration is notable above all for its unequivocal condemnation of Moscow: "Russia's escalating war of aggression against Ukraine endangers peace and security in Europe and globally, highlighting the importance of the strategic partnership between the EU and the Western Balkans region," it stated right at the start of the Declaration. Serbia has agreed to this as well.
Following the meeting of EU foreign ministers and the European Council in Brussels on December 13th and 15th, it is now widely believed that Bosnia and Herzegovina will be granted EU candidate status in accordance with the EU Commission's proposal. Furthermore, the path should be opened for Kosovo citizens to be exempt from visa requirements beginning in January 2024. This has been long delayed, since the country has met the applicable standards for the past four years. The Republic of Kosovo wants to file its official application for EU membership by the end of this year.
The Tirana concerns were already on the table at the Berlin process conference, which Olaf Scholz summoned on November 3 in the German capital. The western Balkan republics also agreed in Berlin to make it simpler to travel within the area using merely ID cards, as well as to agree on mutual recognition of academic and professional degrees. Angela Merkel initiated the Berlin Process in 2014 to foster regional integration and bring Western Balkan countries closer to the EU. However, the format had clearly lost steam in the interim. Unruffled, Merkel depended on Serbian President Aleksandar Vui as a political partner, despite the fact that he fell far short of expectations. EU states have been revived, but also the Western Balkans policy of the European Union.
Despite the summit's success and public consensus, fractures are still visible: The unsolved dispute between Kosovo and Serbia, which still does not recognize Kosovo's independence, has lately erupted multiple times. Even before the Tirana conference, Kosovan President Vjosa Osmani stated unequivocally that this would not be the venue for talks between Belgrade and Prishtina. Perhaps because five EU nations still refuse to acknowledge Kosovo. Aleksandar Vui, on the other hand, explicitly mentioned the potential of his absence ahead of time. He arrived anyhow, but with hostile tones, claiming that the EU had a "pathetic anti-Serbian mentality."
Serbia, the Western Balkans' most populous country, has morphed from a forerunner among ambitious countries to an authoritarian dictatorship owned and controlled by Aleksandar Vui. Simultaneously, North Macedonia and Albania, which had long proved their willingness to compromise and change, were delayed considerably by the national egoism of individual EU member states. Most recently, Bulgaria, with ludicrous nationalist misgivings, postponed the commencement of accession talks with North Macedonia (and hence Albania) until a solution was reached with France.
Above all, North Macedonia had to painfully realize that, despite the historic 2018 Prespa Agreement with Greece, which resolved the name dispute, the country's formal status in the accession negotiations does not mean much: the country has been an applicant for accession since 2005 and was admitted in 2009 proposed by the EU Commission during accession negotiations, but they were not initiated until July 2022.
When Ukraine, Moldova, and maybe Georgia were awarded candidate status in reaction to Russian aggression in June 2022, the Western Balkans finally worried about falling behind in the accession process. The choices and political signals issued since then by Brussels, certain EU member states, and summit gatherings are designed to alleviate this worry. However, without new approaches and instruments in the accession process, as well as internal EU reforms, most notably the elimination of the unanimity principle in foreign policy issues, the potential for blocking member states remains significant due to the numerous veto possibilities before and during the accession negotiations.
Even if candidate nations do their bit and execute changes, this makes progress in the accession process uncertain. As a result, the EU continues to lose trust, particularly among progressive, pro-EU segments of the public. Nonetheless, according to the Balkan Barometer, the region's acceptance percentage for EU membership in 2021 is still 62 percent.
The Western Balkan countries are home to around 18 million people. That is almost the same as the population of North Rhine-Westphalia and only 4% of the present EU population. Despite these data, detractors of expansion prefer to emphasize the possibility that the EU has already reached the limits of its integration capability, which is frequently used as an excuse not to do what is long overdue: strengthen the EU institutions' ability to act through internal reforms. Even after the commencement of the Ukraine war, the costs and security dangers that a non-integrated Western Balkans would entail for the EU in the medium and long term are far too often disregarded.
Then there's the "European Political Community," which will be introduced in Prague in October 2022. This wholly intergovernmental proposal, promoted by French President Emmanuel Macron, has so far created more concerns than it has answered. Apart from demonstrating solidarity with Russia, it has to be seen what function this format may play in conjunction with all of the current organisations. And it remains to be seen if the new initiative, comprised of the European Union and 43 EU and non-EU member states, would add good momentum to the EU expansion effort as a supplementary forum.
Above important, it must not become a substitute for the expansion process and the ultimate objective of full membership for all Western Balkan nations. Otherwise, the EU candidates from south-eastern Europe would have to wait a long time in the waiting area. And the EU to even more reasonable dissatisfaction in the candidate nations' populations. Policy toward the Western Balkans has shifted. However, the actual challenges remain.
Since 2020 the author Ralf Melzer has been heading the regional office Dialogue Southeast Europe of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Sarajevo.