Dealing with Moscow: Three points for a future European strategy

 What is next for Russia? A viable future plan must address three concrete aspects.

Moscow at night

The truth may be stated plainly and succinctly. The Russian assault against Ukraine is disastrous for Ukraine, horrible for Russia, and beneficial for the West (EU and US) - in the sense that it weakens Russia and lessens the security threat. One of the most competent American military specialists summarized the issue in an unusually simple way: "Give conflict a chance." On the one hand, because that is also the aim of the Ukrainian government; on the other hand, because any further extension of the conflict would undermine Russia's military. Paradoxically, any peace attempt launched "too soon" would have the unintended consequence that Moscow, in particular, would be able to exploit.

So far, so straightforward. However, many aspirations and dreams for Russia's future are stacked on top of this obvious knowledge. They occasionally confuse rather than clear how to deal with Russia as a rival and opponent. However, a future plan must include all possibilities, including some that appear unfathomable based on daily news and images from Ukraine. Because it is unlikely that, as promised during the Covid epidemic, the globe would be fully remeasured even after the conclusion of Russia's campaign of aggression and international relations will suddenly follow entirely different laws.

This is what is repeated in conferences and backstage meetings in EU capitals in the East and West: a treaty is required to hold Russia accountable, to hold Russia accountable for the harm created. Moscow must accept responsibility for the aggression, crimes, and devastation in Ukraine. Okay, OK. The Treaty of Versailles is occasionally used as a model and example. But, should any European post-war order be built simply on vengeance? Germany, in particular, is well aware of the ramifications of that deal. By the way, so did the Allies, who selected the helpful Marshal Plan after WWII over the disastrous Morgenthau Plan, which would have reduced Germany to an agricultural state. The Nuremberg trials were still ongoing.

A change in Russian leadership is also wanted, as is punishment before an international court. The latter is unquestionably preferable. But, from the outside, how should a new form of administration, preferably a Western-style democracy, be promoted? Why should this epochal transition in the Muscovite Empire occur today when it did not succeed in the early 1990s, when the framework circumstances were substantially better? The West, which is today frequently attacked in Russia, was regarded in the greatest respect by both the state and society at the time.

Finally, others argue that Russia should lose its permanent position on the UN Security Council. Preferably in collaboration with China. And this at a time when the Global South is growing economic and military might. Whereas many of them have refrained from voting on UN resolutions against Russia. Europe and the United States must abandon the belief that international politics can be structured more or less effortlessly, as it has in recent decades. Great efforts are required to reestablish confidence, particularly with the vast, aspiring industrialized countries of the Global South.

So, what would a promising strategy look like? All of this, from a practical and desired standpoint, is most likely required. After all, we are at a tipping moment in history, and everything seems conceivable. Mind games of various types are being developed right now, and future laboratories are being made available. Nonetheless, despite all efforts to accomplish what is desired because it conforms to one's own ideals, is fair, and adheres to international conventions, politicians cannot escape noticing the growing constraints on their own efficacy.

And, in particular, the following three issues must be examined in relation to Russia. The references should not be interpreted as an invitation to begin discussions. They should also avoid making Russia look greater than it is. Above all, it should not be seen as a signal to Kyiv that Russia's interests are more vital than Ukraine's. However, it serves as a lesson that we must not be fooled by our own power. Weak spots in your own system cannot be overlooked or replaced with wishful thinking.

For starters, nuclear escalation is tough to manage. Despite assurances that the use of nuclear weapons is not desirable. Although the Russian President is a reasonable politician (a characteristic he frequently denies), an emergency of this magnitude cannot be ruled out. Especially considering Russia's military condition and chances of success are poor, yet anything less than triumph is unthinkable from a Russian standpoint. Furthermore, Russia's overall stability may begin to deteriorate. In contrast to the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the West saw the Soviet Union's stability as more vital than the independence of its states, the threat of an implosion nuclear power with an uncertain result is far greater.

Second, the three nations with an association agreement with the EU, namely Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, must not only have the prospect of becoming safe, stable, and wealthy, but also the full and honest backing of the EU. Prosperity, in addition to a sufficient salary, entails social assistance, such as health insurance and pension plans. Contracts must also be concluded with legal clarity. Since 1991, these nations have been undergoing practically continuous transition. But how is this hoped-for last step intended to be executed, and how are western investments supposed to enter the nations without a firm agreement with Russia that these independent governments are autonomous and may act accordingly? A perhaps impolite inquiry. However, a response is required immediately.

Third, the West will no longer be able to solve all problems. Even though it isn't appropriate for a social democrat, Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck Of course, it bears repeating in this context: Throughout his rule, he constantly said that in an unpredictable world where the balance of power is dependent on five states, Germany should always endeavor to be a part of a tripartite coalition against the is impossible to reach. Today's insecurity stems from the reality that the EU, let alone Germany, no longer has any say in such power dynamics.  And that the US, as a truly great power, is also in the minority if you broaden your horizons and look at China and Russia (whose status has many question marks) as well as India and other regional powers. For politicians, the question arises.

Regardless of Russia's apparent incapacity to carry out the initial plan to take Ukraine, as well as the atrocities of aggressive war and the Kremlin's outrageous falsehoods, Western commentators and politicians cannot afford to base future Eastward policy on wishful thinking. This involves developing a new Russia while sitting at a tidy workstation with a bright work lamp.

The author Dr Reinhard Krumm heads the office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation for the Baltic States in Riga.