Europe's support for Ukraine is strong, but not boundless. Sanctions are welcomed, but attitudes on arms exports differ.
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| U.S made M142 HIMARS rocket system in action in Ukraine |
For more than 300 days, A war has raged in Europe's near area, with no end in sight. Last year, it would have been difficult to foresee the reactions to Russia's war on Ukraine. The EU has implemented many broad sanctions on Russia, the economic consequences of which will be seen in the long run. The decoupling of European economies from Russian fossil raw resources, which should not be visible until the end of the decade as part of the green transition, was pushed through without delay. The ruptured Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipes on the Baltic Sea floor are a symbol of this failed energy alliance.
NATO nations are supplying Ukraine with weaponry on an unprecedented scale in order to sustain the country's defensive capacity and prevent the Russian onslaught from succeeding. The customary heated arguments in Europe about the dispersal of refugees failed in the case of the millions of Ukrainians. The numerous displaced individuals from the conflict were lodged and cared for in an unbureaucratic manner, with significant help from civil society. Even the Polish administration, which had forcefully turned away migrants from Belarus at the border only a few months ago, now boasts that it is home to the greatest number of Ukrainians in Europe.
In this dire crisis, the maxim for action was clear: assist the attacked Ukraine in defending itself against Russia. Losses in one's own level of living owing to increased costs, as well as the necessity to invest more money in defense in the future, were acknowledged.
Many EU and NATO member nations are torn between support and partisanship. This is only emphasized by the manner in which support for Ukraine is rationalized and legitimized. Because rhetorically, Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his countrymen have demonstrated that they support Europe's principles (Ursula von der Leyen) or the European order of freedom and peace (Annalena Baerbock) or that standing up for Ukraine defends peace, freedom, and democracy ( Boris Johnson). These assertions are eclipsed by the more basic assertion that Russia's war against Ukraine is an ideological conflict between autocracy and democracy, which is frequently demonstrated with historical instances. As part of the assailed community of values, the conflict is being transformed into Europe's war.
At the same time, there must be some separation and delineation. In practice, a precise difference is drawn between help to the attacked as defined by the United Nations Charter and actually engaging the fight. The most crucial reason for this is obvious: to avoid a further escalation of the conflict into a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO itself, which is frequently summed up brutally under the catchy title "World War III". However, the demarcation in this situation is not always apparent, because it is questionable if the crucial persons in Moscow are acting in accordance with international law norms (rather not).
As a result, a political dynamic has emerged in recent months centered on weaponry transfers to Ukraine, sparking fierce discussion in certain NATO nations. Because, even if unconditional support is communicated, it does not apply to every type of weapon desired by Ukraine or offered by other powers. In Germany, this was initially recognized in the fairly broad class of "heavy weaponry". The present argument centers on the supply of Western-style main battle tanks, which a number of specialists advocate.
Germany's attitude - "we only provide in collaboration with our friends" - has been criticized since the dangers of escalation are often appraised differently than by the federal government's normally more cautious action. When making judgments, the focus is always on the United States, whose perception of what can and cannot be given has so far directed the other allies. This was true from the start of the MiG-29 transfer from Poland to Ukraine, as well as the Ukrainian government's need for long-range missile weapons. Both were rejected by Washington because it appeared that the war may be exacerbated by either Russian use of weapons of mass destruction or hostilities spilling over into Alliance territory.
The reference to the United States is crucial and warranted, given its critical role in the alliance's defense. Because, even if it is frequently missed in the heated debates regarding Ukraine's assistance, the United States, with its nuclear weapons and conventional capability, is critical for both deterrent and defense or retaliation to an attack. Uncoordinated action by another NATO member would thus be not only reckless, but also inappropriate for a collective security organization.
However, there is another reason for the persistent prudence. The public's willingness to assist Ukraine is limited. Because, for many European societies, the expression "only there instead of in the center" best describes their own situation in this battle. This is emphasized by the fact that there is little sign that the war's political excesses are being shared. Few people consider the war to be a battle between democracies and autocracies, or even a proxy war between Russia and the West.
Although Russia is commonly regarded as a threat, the possibility of a conflict between Russia and the West has resurfaced in people's minds. While this only pertained to the EU's eastern member states in 2021, it is now broadly shared both East and West. Many individuals feel that their governments should intervene in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine because Russia is viewed as an aggressor acting alone.
However, the form of interference has the same red line as in NATO's decision-making rounds. Sanctions against Russia, including a boycott of energy imports, are supported by large majorities, even if it involves significant financial sacrifices in some situations. The transfer of armaments to Ukraine, on the other hand, is far more contentious, and this is true not only for Germany and France, but also for Latvia and Poland. The deployment of soldiers, on the other hand, is the clearest crossing of the boundary between assistance and engagement.
This demonstrates that the threat of losing control and so escalating the conflict may be recognized not just at the cabinet table, but also at the kitchen table in Europe. As a result, the cautious political maneuvering on the razor's edge between support and partisanship will continue in the coming months. At the same time, as far as military realities allow, there is a need to continue explaining and make this route intelligible. Only in this way can the high level of public support for Ukraine's help be sustained in the future.
The author Christos Katsioulis heads the Regional Office for Cooperation and Peace of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Vienna.