The growth of China presents challenges to the existing order in the world. In the foreseeable future, there is no way to go past Beijing when it comes to reaching agreements on disarmament and weapons control.
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| [Chinese President Xi Jinping during Chinese military parade in 2019 with DF-100 hypersonic cruise missile on background] |
The responsibility of creating an all-encompassing German China policy for the first time has been taken on by the traffic light coalition. Olaf Scholz, the Federal Chancellor, issued the following statement on behalf of the government on December 15, 2021: “We must connect our China policy with the China that we really discover.” This also implies that we do not turn a blind eye to the dire state of affairs regarding human rights and that we refer to transgressions of global standards by their proper titles. The fact that China is such a large country with such a long history gives it an important role in the global symphony of peoples. This cannot be changed by anything that has been said. Because of this, we have extended an offer of collaboration to China about the problems that humanity is now confronting, such as the climate catastrophe, the pandemic, and weapons control. But how is it really conceivable to limit the weapons race with China? and what exactly can Germany and the EU bring to the table in this regard?
There is no doubt about it: China intends to and will play a significant part in the process of establishing the global security system that will govern the 21st century. There are possibilities and dangers included within this. One the one hand, the Chinese government in Beijing is prepared to take on more responsibilities inside the framework of the United Nations. China is now the nation that provides the most funding to United Nations operations among the permanent members of the Security Council. The nation is a signatory to a significant number of arms control treaties in addition to all of the main international WMD control regimes. However, China’s pursuit of greater influence comes with associated dangers, particularly if the country prioritizes the development of its military in order to better compete with the United States. China’s goal is to build a force that is on par with the United States’ in terms of technical sophistication by the year 2050.
The People’s Republic of China views itself as a power that shapes the global economy, as a trade power, as a key power in Asia, and as the biggest developing nation in the world; nevertheless, the term “developing country” would probably be more suitable. China’s goal as a discourse power is to actively participate in the process of shaping the global agenda while also influencing the development of the norms and institutions that make up the international system. The emergence of China took happened, for the most part, within the confines of the order that was already in place, particularly the economic and security orders. On the other hand, China’s objective is not to topple the existing system but rather to alter it in accordance with its own principles. This also categorically applies to the realm of foreign policy that deals with disarmament, weapons control, and non-proliferation. The most essential aspects of its foreign policy are the maximum of welfare and the establishment of framework circumstances that are conducive to the achievement of this aim.
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| [Dong Feng 31 ICBM of Chinese PLARF] |
The United States of America, on the other hand, considers the growth of the People’s Republic of China to be the most significant geopolitical obstacle of the 21st century and a danger to the worldwide hegemony it has established for itself. The conversation does not seem to be leading anywhere definitively. In the political system of the United States, there is a widespread agreement on the need to oppose China. Above all else, this agreement is what is still keeping the United States’ global politics and the alliance ties of the highly divided nation together.
Since at the very least 2017, the struggle for dominance has been at the epicenter of what has been referred to as the “American-Chinese global confrontation.” The ensuing military rivalry may, in some instances, become autonomous, but it is, in principle, susceptible to containment via the use of arms control. On the path leading to total animosity, it is quite evident that this objective will not be reached under any circumstances.
When compared on a global scale, China is a long way from reaching the level of military might possessed by the United States. The People’s Republic of China models itself after the capabilities of the United States of America. The number of ships in the Chinese fleet makes it the biggest in the world, although China’s armed forces are not nearly as strong as those of other countries’. In East Asia in particular, disturbing worst-case scenarios are shaping views of each other’s security at alarmingly high levels. Armaments constraints are not yet aligned due to a lack of mutually determined substantive criteria that may be employed in this process. Establishing the People’s Republic of China as a militarily secondary power is no longer a viable option. A rearmament of the nation that is not controlled in any way is also bad. As a direct consequence of this, immediate action is required to facilitate weapons control and cooperative security.
The Chinese government’s policy on disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation adheres to a set of well-defined guiding principles. However, it is by no means “cast from one mould,” but rather highly contradictory in terms of the aims that are being pursued and the understanding of the roles that are being played. In particular, these inconsistencies might serve as beginning points for the development of a policy on arms control.
The actions of the Chinese government in these sectors are guided by three principles: To begin, China does not want any constraints placed on its own armaments policy as a result of related accords as long as the United States of America is not subject to stipulations that are analogous. Second, Beijing is opposed to international instruments and processes that, in its perspective, constitute a “intervention in domestic matters” and so are not acceptable. It is imperative that the verification and transparency procedures be as invasive as is practically practicable, that the control of weaponry be intergovernmental, and that the concept of consensus be maintained. Thirdly, despite the fact that China follows the financial and technical criteria that come from weapons control agreements to the letter, the country is hesitant to offer help that goes beyond what is required.
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| [Chinese Army special force regiment] |
While this is going on, China’s policy on some topics vacillates between conflicting aims and different interpretations of their functions. While on the one hand China behaves as a recognized nuclear weapon state inside the alliance of the five veto powers of the United Nations Security Council (also known as the “P5”), on the other hand China utilizes the language of a non-aligned state when it comes to matters of disarmament. China seeks to increase non-proliferation, but from the viewpoint of a (former) developing nation, it attaches a great deal of value to measures that encourage technological exchange between contracting parties. China’s goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons from the world. In the eyes of the Germans, it is precisely these ambivalences that have the potential to serve as the jumping off point for a conversation about the policy of arms control. This is due to the fact that the positions of China in this regard are relatively flexible, and Berlin is able to enter into discussions with Beijing about the various role perceptions.
Because of the significance of China, global disarmament and weapons control regimes will not be able to operate effectively in the medium term without Beijing’s participation in these processes. In order to at least slow down the pace of arms races, confidence-building strategies need to be implemented at the regional level. In the context of trilateral discussions with Russia and the United States, making clumsy demands on China, such as reducing the number of its own nuclear weapons to a minimal level, would not increase the likelihood of success. Since the Russian-American dialogue on strategic stability has been suspended, during which time follow-up agreements to the New START treaty on the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons, which will expire in 2026, were being discussed, the question of whether or not China should be included in the treaty is no longer relevant for the time being. On the bright side, the government of Vice President Joe Biden is prepared.
Beyond the core perspectives that are up for debate, it is worthwhile to investigate the potential for a coordinated or even a combined response to the problems surrounding arms control policy. The odds of success for efforts to participate in discourse about weapons control may be increased by being specific, being flexible, and being ready to engage in dialogue.
To begin, platforms for the dialogue of policy on weapons control should, to the greatest extent practicable, be maintained apart from forums for the dialogue of policy on other aspects of security policy. Greater involvement on the part of China in agreements to limit military capacities is valuable in and of itself for the following reasons: such cooperation can contribute to long-term change in the political relationship; it can also establish channels of communication; and it can help promote an understanding of shared interests.
Second, conversations need to be as topic-focused as is humanly feasible. The area of disarmament and weapons control has meanwhile grown so differentiated that the broad call for China’s engagement is futile, since this is already taking place to a significant extent. This has occurred because the field has become so diverse.
Third, subjects in which China’s conception of its role is still ambiguous should serve as the beginning point for any offers of discussions that are made. The People’s Republic still considers itself to be a developing nation, and as a result, it is prepared, just like the rest of the Global South, to engage in already established humanitarian arms control treaties or to debate new themes linked to the United Nations Weapons Convention.
In the fourth place, it is necessary to encourage China’s involvement in the various groupings of nations that are now in existence. Even casual exchanges may be helpful in gaining a better understanding of how Chinese thinking is formed, so laying the groundwork for more serious debate to be initiated at a later time. In this approach, hopefully, it will be feasible to include China in debates about weapons control policies that are taking place in which Russia is not a participant.
The development of regional trust, minimization of regional risks, and verification of regional information are especially interesting themes. On issues pertaining to the expansion of regional trust and confidence, Germany can suggest to China that they engage in a two-way exchange of their respective experiences. It is now exceedingly improbable that there would be weapons control in the Indo-Pacific region, thus confidence- and security-building measures might be viewed as the initial steps towards cooperative security. The security architecture of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) provides not only strong beginning points for regional agreements in the field of confidence- and security-building measures, but it also offers other benefits. In the course of a German-Chinese exchange of experiences, possible measures based on regional reciprocity should be discussed. These include transparency, the notice of maneuvers from a particular personnel or weapon strength, and so on.
It makes sense and seems to be within China’s capabilities to participate in talks regarding improving the verification of arms control agreements, often known as monitoring compliance with the accords. In addition, to address Chinese worries on the potential for Western powers to exploit such tools for spying purposes. The Chinese government has exhibited a general interest in nuclear verification concerns, despite the fact that they have very limited expertise in the relatively vital area of arms control.
Concerns with the mitigation of nuclear dangers might provide an additional thematic entrance point for a discussion on arms control policy. There are many areas in which we can find common ground, particularly in terms of minimizing the role that nuclear weapons play. Germany, along with a number of other nations that share its perspective, has made many attempts, all of which have been fruitless, to kick off conversations with the nuclear weapon states concerning legally obligatory security assurances. On the other hand, China is a proponent of the idea that governments that possess nuclear weapons should abstain from making their first use of nuclear weapons, thus there are undeniably overlapping perspectives here.
Arms control is important in and of itself as a value. It is possible that China’s continued and increased participation in arms control regimes might make a significant contribution to the international regulatory policy’s effort to achieve stability. It is probable that the establishment of a more robust commitment will be a process that takes place over time and that may be pushed via various forms of engagement with Germany and the EU. Such endeavors run the risk of being unsuccessful, but the appropriate option would be to either not attempt them at all or put their completion off until a later date.
The author Dr. Oliver Meier and Prof. Dr. Michael Staack .