To the disadvantage of democracy, Germany allows for arguments that are not distinguished on a variety of topics, including corona measures, energy policy, and the conflict against Ukraine.
According to the consensus of most people, Germany is split down the middle. There is no way to reconcile opposing points of view. In recent years, there has been a rise in the degree to which the nation is divided. The divide will get much wider during the winter months as a direct result of the high cost of electricity. There is a strong possibility of a harsh winter.
But does the image of a nation that is split in two really reflect reality?
In the year 2021, large majority of people, 78 percent, identified themselves as being in the political center. This unwavering commitment to the political center has been, and will continue to be, a hallmark of German politics. More than seventy percent of respondents have consistently positioned themselves somewhere in the political middle since since data gathering first began in 1976. Although there has been a little increase in support for political extremism since 2013, this support is still lower than it was in the 1980s and is just a few percentage points greater than it was in prior years. Large majority, on the other hand, like reaching concessions rather than strictly enforcing their own principles. When it comes to a variety of social problems, such as equal rights for men and women or the rights of homosexuals, Germany has also grown more tolerant over the course of the last several decades.
But not just polls but also the political philosophy of colors in Germany testify against the perception of Germany as a divided nation. In Germany, there are a total of 13 potential coalition combinations to choose from. Examples of combinations are Kenya, Jamaica, and Germany. Traffic lights also fall under this category. Every major party is now in a coalition with every other major party, with the exception of the AfD. There is not yet a functioning government led by the Left, the FDP, or the CDU. In a society that is deeply divided, it is difficult to see almost all of the parties coming together to create coalitions. There is a widespread perception in Germany that political parties are not sufficiently differentiated from one another, which may be translated as a lack of polarization.
The fact that there have been an increasing number of swing voters throughout the years, but a decreasing number of regular voters, is another argument that may be made against the idea that the nation is split. A split would have shown either a strong allegiance to one party or a more conclusive break with the respective former party.
What possible explanations are there for this confusing picture?
One of the reasons is the tendency of the media to exaggerate things. Conflict and tense situations may not inevitably result in news, consensus, or compromise. One further consideration is social media. There is a premium placed on excitement as well as contrast and clicks.
Above all else, however, it is a discussion that is often general and lacking in differentiation, which continually works to promote the deceptive picture of the "deep split."
The word "division" conjures up images of a physical barrier that cuts straight through the middle of the nation. There are two camps that are around the same size as each other and are opposite one another. In point of fact, the AfD and the other parties in Germany represent the primary chasm that separates them from one another. The AfD has distanced itself from the underlying consensus that the majority holds through its deep-seated mistrust of official institutions, of many media outlets, and by its hostility against members of underrepresented groups. However, this is not a divide in the nation as a whole; rather, it is a split among a minority.
The democratic process often results in contentious debates. At other times, the rags literally fly. However, not every difficult disagreement amounts to a schism, which might be defined as a divergence that is difficult to reconcile when it comes to questions of fundamental democratic principles. In the German discussion, many people have a hard time differentiating between what constitutes a difficult argument and where the two sides begin to diverge.
The democratic right to protest against excessively high energy costs exists. Inflation and the cost of living are key concerns that need to be battled about, even out in public, if we want social cohesiveness to be preserved. On the other hand, demonstrations opposing energy policy are often and hastily confused with radicalism. The discussion, rather than placing the real issue at the forefront of the conversation, veers off into an argument pitting "us" against "them." The issues at hand are very weighty, and their significance cannot be overstated. It is becoming more difficult to listen to the other viewpoint. The discussion is causing a rift.
Oddly enough, much as in the discussion on Corona and Ukraine, the political center is the one that feeds this paradox. She often lumps together dissenters of the corona measures, those who believe in lateral thinking, Nazis, and members of other organizations. The fact that political extremists are "using oil costs and inflation for their own objectives" has infuriated her to no end. It's possible that this is bad in some instances, but isn't it also a democratic standard that all political factions, including the most extremist ones, utilize crises to rally their supporters?
There is also a lot of discussion about a divide in western democracies in this argument; the storming of the Capitol in January of 2021 has become the emblem for this. When seen in this light, the substantial distinctions that exist between the nations are obscured.
In contrast to the situation in Germany, just 36 percent of people in France consider themselves to be part of the political middle, while 20 percent of French people call themselves "extreme." Even more polarization may be seen in the United States. There, Democrats and Republicans are in direct opposition to one another and cannot find common ground. Large portions of the Republican party have broken away from the fundamental democratic consensus on a number of key issues, including the results of elections, faith in state institutions, and the credibility of the media.
Lastly, in the German discussion, the fact that Germany's political system scarcely pays a political reward on polarization and division is rarely emphasized. This is despite the fact that this is one of the most important points of the argument. Because of Germany's proportional representation system, outright majorities are very uncommon, and coalitions are the typical form of government. In this system, the inability to reach a compromise is nearly certain to be the cause of one's political demise. The federal system that Germany is organized under gives additional incentives for reaching agreements. The political system is consequently built to allow for compromise, in contrast to that of the United States, where extreme viewpoints are rewarded via party primaries, gerrymandering, and the electoral college.
It is not safe to assume that Germany is in the clear based on this differentiated image.
When polarization permeates public perception and people pay little attention to what they have in common, this poses a challenge for democratic institutions. Additionally, nothing stays the same for always. Even in the past, having a powerful political center and weak political outskirts is no guarantee for the future. Opinion formation is more dispersed than it has ever been as a result of the fragmented media environment, which presents a significant challenge for democracy and social cohesion.
It could be helpful to have a discourse that is more nuanced and that takes into consideration the complexities of social cohesiveness. It creates a more realistic image and helps detect and fend off risks to cohesiveness and democracy. It also helps present a more accurate picture. It is also helpful to have more serenity and self-confidence in one's own power while interacting with extremist organizations, as the examples of Norway and Finland demonstrate. There, the achievements of extremist parties were not seen as a sign that democracy was entering its twilight years.
The author Dr. Nils Meyer-Ohlendorf is head of the International and European Governance Program at Ecologic Institute in Berlin.
Source: IPG