The tipping point will provide the German arms sector with a significant and welcome boost. It is past time to put restrictions on the export of weaponry.
It is most likely one of the most challenging initiatives ever undertaken by the government in charge of traffic lights: As part of the coalition agreement reached in the fall of 2021, the SPD, the Greens, and the FDP decided to make it a priority to adopt a weapons export legislation for the very first time in order to put into effect a policy that places restrictions on the export of weaponry. This is done with the intention of putting an end to the historical uncertainty caused by the existence of many legal and political basis for weapons exports and establishing a new, more secure foundation for German arms export policy. The spring was when the competent federal ministry, the Federal Ministry of Economics and Climate Protection, started making preparations for the project. During the declarations and hearings, non-governmental organizations, scientific institutes, and interest groups were all given the opportunity to present their points of view. It is anticipated that the project will be finished by this year.
At the same time, the Russian campaign of aggression in Ukraine challenged the foundations of German policy on both foreign and domestic security. A substantial rearmament of the Bundeswehr was voted upon by the Bundestag in the spring, after a "turning point" announcement made in the spring by the Federal Chancellor. This decision was made using the 100 billion Euro special budget. The circumstances that serve as a basis for the framework of the weapons export policy have also evolved. The establishment of the special fund has made it materially possible for Germany to implement a more limited weapons export policy. The behavior of the Russian government lends credence to the security policy logic underlying a selective arms export policy. This policy aims to strengthen allies within NATO and the EU and is only willing to make deliveries to third countries in exceptional circumstances. The behavior of the Russian government lends credence to this policy. After the turn of the century, the federal government will also have the opportunity to act more toward the achievement of these aims throughout Europe.
The general public, on the other hand, tends to have a very different interpretation of the effects of the conflict in Ukraine, which is that it is a signal for a less restricted weapons export policy. During the heated debate about German arms exports to the Ukraine, which was marked by speculation and suspicion, there was a common misconception that the delivery of arms to a war party involved a significant shift in German arms export policy. This led to the discussion becoming heated and contentious. In point of fact, such supplies have already been made more frequently in the past, particularly to allies such as the United States and Great Britain, but in rare cases also to those involved in the war in third countries - the support of the Kurdish Peshmerga in Iraq beginning in 2014 is the case that is the most well-known. The policy that the federal government has in place regarding the export of weaponry extends to encompass these types of deliveries as well. There, as an exception to the intended restrictiveness toward third countries, armaments exports to recipients who fall under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which enshrines the right to national self-defence, are explicitly stated as being allowed. This is because Article 51 of the United Nations Charter enshrines the right to national self-defence.
The delivery of arms to the Ukraine that has now taken place is, both quantitatively and qualitatively, more comprehensive than previous arms exports to third countries involved in the war; however, neither the principle nor the practice of German arms export policy has changed as a result of these deliveries. The Russian attack on Ukraine, which is a violation of international law, demonstrates the usefulness of the existing regulation to support the right to self-defence, which corresponds to a fundamentally restrictive but internationally responsible arms export policy. The attack was carried out in violation of international law.
Some of the findings drawn from the special fund established by the Bundeswehr for the armaments export program are questionable as well. During the hearings that were held in the spring to prepare a law for the export of weapons, some of the arms businesses who were invited to participate argued for the export limits to be loosened in order to boost the efficiency of this financial package. The primary contention was that Germany's export controls on jointly created systems need to be relaxed in order for desired joint manufactures with other EU and NATO member states to become a reality. In point of fact, in the past, differing export restrictions have been the cause of political upheaval and delays in the completion of joint projects. One example of this is the difference in export regulations between Germany and France. In the end, the state that was successful was often the one whose bargaining position was stronger, particularly as a result of the fact that its financial contribution was greater.
The argument presented by the arms industry is not only unhelpful in terms of the policy governing security, but it also fails to take into account the potential for collaboration in Europe. Germany's negotiating leverage will improve as a result of the establishment of the 100 billion euro special fund, which will be used for joint project discussions. In addition, the economic pressure to employ industrial capacity via weapons exports has increased as a direct result of increases in procurement budgets in almost all EU and NATO member states. This is also the case in such nations. The economic foundations for the establishment of a European arms manufacturing industry have been strengthened. What has not yet been accomplished, however, is the establishment of a politically stable and long-term framework, which, not least of all, must also include a responsible European arms export policy.
The anticipated growth in the armaments industry presents an opportunity to buck the current trend, which sees an ever-increasing proportion of European and German armaments being exported to third countries (where the proportion is even higher). In recent years, this trend has seen the export of approximately half of all German armaments. Instead, the conditions for a European armaments policy are being improved. This policy will combine a robust European armaments industry that is less dependent on the United States of America and is primarily geared towards the domestic market with a restrictive European armaments export policy. Together, these factors will create a European armaments policy that will be effective. At the very least in the context of collaborative endeavors, the federal government need to put its plans for a constrained weapons export policy towards partner nations like France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain into practice by making use of the economic potential of the special fund.
It's interesting to note that this strategy has been supported by a contractual foundation for over twenty years now. The Farnborough Agreement, which was reached in the year 2000 between the six states and the most important European armaments industries, stipulates that any arms exports to third countries resulting from joint projects must first receive the approval of all of the countries that took part in the development of those projects. On the other hand, the agreement has not yet been implemented in any one particular individual's proceedings. The federal government has a history of caving in to threats, particularly those made by France, that it will only participate in a joint venture if it is allowed to make its own choices on the export of its products. The establishment of the special fund increases Germany's economic negotiating leverage, which is essential for the successful implementation of the Farnborough Agreement. For the sake of clarity about this issue, the federal government need to make advantage of this in the future and embed the export rules of the Farnborough Agreement in the proposed arms export law.
At the turn of the century, not only did the economic framework circumstances shift for a limited weapons export policy in Germany and Europe, but also the thinking behind their security strategy. Up until this point, German and European arms exports to third countries – insofar as they were shaped by security policy considerations and not only by economic goals – were geared towards good relations with the governments (regardless of the type of political regime), as long as they did not violate human rights on a massive scale. This was the case so long as the governments did not violate human rights on a massive scale. Among the most significant purchasers of German and European arms were Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and the United Arab Emirates.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought to light the critical significance of the political system of a country that has the potential to become a receiver of military exports. The tendency for authoritarian governments to be hostile toward the rest of the world is particularly common in situations in which people in power get the majority of their authority from the state's security apparatus. Arming such dictatorships is a dangerous game to play. In addition, the importation of guns into such regimes is often linked to corrupt practices, the rewards of which may subsequently be used to bolster political authority.
The issue of what kind of political regime is in place has not been addressed in any of the relevant German legislation or in any of the political principles regarding weapons transfers up to this point. The same can be said about the unified stance that the European Union takes on the export of weaponry. These laws place a significant emphasis on some characteristics of the dichotomy that exists between democratic and non-democratic nations, such as the risk of substantial breaches of human rights; nonetheless, the nature of the regime itself is not one of those factors.
When it comes to making decisions on the shipment of armaments, policymakers in a few nations in Europe have entertained the idea of adding the nature of the political system to the list of factors that should be examined. This conversation has progressed the farthest in Sweden, where a criteria of this kind has been included into the most current rules for the export of guns. The more far-reaching suggestion to ban out weapons shipments to authoritarian nations that was made by a number of non-governmental groups in Sweden was not enacted, however, owing to the government's worries about the economic ramifications for the Swedish arms industry. In this regard, the federal government has the potential to advance the economic foundation of the special fund by one step.
The author Michael Brzoska, Ph.D., is a senior research fellow at the University of Hamburg's Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH).
Source: IPG