The conflict in Ukraine has shed light on the limitations of nuclear deterrence. A first strike waiver should be advocated for by the West as an alternative to rearmament.
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In the next month, New York City will play host to the Tenth Review Conference for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Because to the Corona epidemic, the gathering of states, which was initially scheduled to take place in April of 2020, has been postponed four times. During this time, with Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the general political climate has deteriorated to such an extent that progress in disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons almost does not seem possible. This is due to the fact that Russia's war of aggression has been going on for quite some time. A revival in nuclear deterrence and weaponry is being fueled by Russia's war and nuclear threats, which are also strengthening existing fractures in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The conflict in Ukraine has shed light on the less desirable aspects of the nuclear deterrent, and we need to accept them right now in order to forestall the impending weakening of this fundamental pillar of global arms control.
Since it was signed in 1968, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has, despite its track record, also been the site of controversies and crises. On the one hand, they included regional proliferation issues, such as the fact that North Korea and Iran continued to work toward their nuclear arming despite the fact that both countries had joined the NPT. On the other side, there was no significant progress made on the dismantlement of nuclear weapons. The nuclear powers saw a period of significant development throughout the Cold War, notably in the 1980s. Although there was a subsequent reduction in the size of the arsenals, a relatively large number of warheads continued to be produced ( currently an estimated 12,705 warheads worldwide). Because of this issue, the unlimited extension of the contract, which had initially been capped at 25 years, was in danger of falling through in the year 1995. Today, all nuclear-armed nations who are parties to the NPT are working to develop new delivery technologies and undertake extensive modernization projects for their nuclear arsenals. Some countries, such as China and Britain, are even expanding the total number of warheads they possess.
The Russian Federation's aggressive campaign on Ukraine is making these issues much worse. The events that have transpired since February 24 are, in the opinion of a significant number of Western decision-makers and observers, evidence of the dependability of nuclear deterrence. After all, Western countries are not directly involved in the conflict in Russia. Some people dispute the legitimacy of the nuclear deterrent that NATO has, claiming that it has encouraged Russia to behave in an aggressive manner. Both of these analyses result in proposals for more nuclear weaponry. The nuclear involvement and deterrent strategy of NATO has gained the approval of a majority of the populace in Germany for the very first time.
At the same time, it is necessary to be concerned about a further escalation and expansion of regional proliferation. On many social networks and in the mainstream media, it is often stated that Russia's aggression against Ukraine would not have occurred if Ukraine had been armed with nuclear weapons. In point of fact, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine was never in control of the arsenal that was stationed on its territory. In spite of this, several governments are looking more favorably on nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence in light of the Russian invasion. The violation of the Budapest Memorandum has eroded people's faith in the reliability of negative security promises.
The mutual fear of utter annihilation helps to prevent hostilities between nuclear-armed governments and their allies, which in turn ensures peace and security for all parties involved. The drawbacks of nuclear deterrence, on the other hand, are becoming more obvious in light of the present situation. In its conflict with Ukraine, Russia is carrying the nuclear threat to its logical conclusion by using nuclear weapons for the express purpose of advancing the conflict. They are no longer mainly used for defending against or preventing an escalation of conventional military activity. Moscow, on the other hand, makes advantage of them in order to improve the likelihood of a good conclusion for Russia and to achieve its imperialist objectives. This violates both the right to individual and collective self-defense as well as the prohibition on aggressive war that is inscribed in the United Nations charter.
In 1985 and early 2021, respectively, the presidents of the United States of America and the Soviet Union and Russia announced that a nuclear war was impossible to win and, as a result, should not be undertaken. However, the view that nuclear weapons should only be used as a last option in the event that the opposing side launches a nuclear strike is not one that has been held by all nuclear countries for a considerable amount of time. Both Russia and the United States have expressed worry over the years on the prospect of "limited" nuclear warfare and the use of tactical nuclear weapons. This expansion of the nuclear deterrent, as was shown by the menacing gestures made by the Russian government, leads to the breakdown of the nuclear taboo, which the nuclear doctrines are meant to help reinforce. This highlights a paradoxical aspect of nuclear deterrence, which is that the more it is used and the more nuclear threats are neutralized, the more probable it is that nuclear conflict will escalate.
At this point in time, both NATO and Russia have a common interest in ensuring that the conflict does not go beyond the boundaries of Ukraine. On the other hand, in the event that Moscow anticipates suffering a decisive loss later in the conflict, it may decide to use nuclear weapons designed for tactical use. The conflict in Ukraine demonstrates the precarious nature of nuclear deterrence. Because their capacity to be predicted would be undermined if there was no widespread agreement over the circumstances that would lead to the use of nuclear weapons.
What does this imply for the NPT Review Conference that is going to take place soon? When the 191 countries who are signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty get together in New York, they do so under the long shadow thrown by the conflict in the very eastern part of Ukraine. The "Cuba Crisis" that occurred over 60 years ago was, much like the conflict in Ukraine, a stress test of nuclear deterrent. Therefore, it would be beneficial for the delegates to take a look back at history at this point. The placement of Soviet medium-range missiles in Cuba in the autumn of 1962, followed by a naval blockade of Cuba by the United States, pushed the whole world to the verge of nuclear war. The evacuation of Soviet nuclear weapons in return for concessions from the United States brought an end to the crisis after it had lasted for 13 days (public and private). Even back then, Western experts and decision-makers saw this as evidence that nuclear deterrence posed by the United States was successful. Even back then, it served as a pretext for the increase of nuclear arsenals.
In spite of this, the Cuban Missile Crisis served not only as a "transformative event," but also as a deciding factor in the establishment of confidence-building and risk-reducing measures between the two nuclear powers. This involves the creation of direct relationships at the highest political and military levels as well as debates on the subject of strategic stability. At the international level, Russia and the United States collaborated to maintain the status quo of the nuclear order, although to each country's benefit. Examples of this include the extension of the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the parties to which are scheduled to convene in New York City in August of 2022.
If the risks of nuclear escalation resulting from nuclear deterrence are taken seriously, there is also the potential for a transformational opportunity to emerge from the conflict in Ukraine. The strategy of nuclear de-escalation that was implemented by the administration of Joe Biden and NATO was a step in the right way. The use of the highest military contact points to minimize misperceptions has also helped to prevent an inadvertent expansion or even a nuclear escalation of the Ukraine conflict. This was made possible by the use of the highest military contact points. These efforts to limit risk must be further enhanced and consolidated, and they must do so while adhering to the NPT's guidelines.
At the next review conference, the United States, France, and Britain, together with their allies, should take the lead to tighten the nuclear taboo. The most convincing argument would be a joint declaration on the waiver of first use, combined with an internationally binding commitment not to launch nuclear attacks on states that are members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), or a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone. This would be a declaration on the waiver of first use by all parties involved. To put a halt to the dangerous delimitation of deterrence that has taken place over the last several years, deterrence must be scaled down to its barest essentials, namely nuclear defense in the event of a nuclear strike. A public declaration would not result in a reduction in military choices since it is quite probable that a first NATO deployment would not be carried out anyhow.
Other significant countries, such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa, along with other governments that do not possess nuclear weapons, are in favor of a policy of nuclear restraint; but, they do not want to be pushed into a new struggle between the East and the West. A widespread coalition opposed to the use of nuclear weapons has the potential to enhance the amount of pressure that is placed on Russia to desist from making any more nuclear threats in order to avoid isolating itself. During this moment, the western governments that possess nuclear weapons should work to rebuild their citizens' faith in the negative security assurances that Russia had dismantled, therefore lending their support to the system that governs nuclear non-proliferation.
The author Dr Caroline Fehl is a researcher at the Leibniz Institute Hessian Foundation for Peace and Conflict Research (PRIF) in Frankfurt