The growth of China and the conflict in Ukraine bring an end to the worldwide hegemony of the United States. It is possible that in the distant future, exclusive zones of influence may once again decide the order of the globe.

New World Order: Return of the great power concert?
[New World Order]


The conflict in Ukraine ultimately symbolizes the end of the Pax Americana, which was the international order established following the conclusion of the Cold War that was controlled by the United States. Moscow and Beijing are thus openly challenging the primacy of the United States. Although Russia has shown in recent months that it is a quasi-giant, the global balance of power is still changing in favor of East Asia. This is despite the fact that Russia has proved itself to be a pseudo-giant. The United States, over the course of the last several years, has come to the realization that China is a credible competitor for global hegemony. There are aspirations of becoming a powerhouse in a multipolar configuration in Moscow, Delhi, and Brussels as well. The era of unipolarity that followed the West's triumph in the Cold War has come to an end. This much can be said with absolute certainty.


But beyond that, what more is there? It is helpful to look back in history in order to comprehend the processes behind the formation and fall of global systems. A gathering of major powers helped establish order in a globe with several poles of influence throughout the lengthy 19th century. At the time, both international law and multilateral organizations were in an infantile stage of development. The successful negotiation of areas of interest both at congresses and in backrooms was the key to maintaining a level of relative stability throughout the European continent. On the other hand, the European colonial powers' aggressive expansion to the outside world was the price that had to be paid to secure domestic stability.


The outbreak of the First World War resulted in the dissolution of this organization. After then, there were uprisings and battles over the next three decades. The interests of growing and collapsing major powers clashed outwardly without being filtered, while within the corrupt institutions were unable to socially cushion the effects of the economic revolutions. This is similar to the situation that exists now.


Following the conclusion of the Second International War, the foundations of a liberal world order were established with the establishment of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Nevertheless, the endeavor was swiftly thwarted by the inherent contradiction of the cold war's structure. During the conflict between the East and the West on a bipolar scale, the United Nations was mostly obstructed. The question is, why did the Cold War not turn into a heated one? From the Hungarian revolt through the Prague Spring and on through the Cuban Missile Crisis, peace has been maintained by the implicit acknowledgement of exclusive zones of influence.

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the American superpower was quick to declare the establishment of a new international order. In a world dominated by a single superpower, every breach of the laws was met with approval by the USA, which served as the world's chief law enforcement agency. The advocates of a liberal order in the globe refer to the progress made in democratic governments and the protection of human rights all across the world during this time period. In most cases, critics would assume that imperial objectives are the driving force behind humanitarian missions. However, even in more progressive quarters, a lot of people were pinning their hopes on the development of international law and global collaboration.


However, due to the fact that the Western world is now lurching from one crisis to the next, cooperative techniques are rapidly becoming caught up in the dense competition of the new system. The acknowledgment of exclusive spheres of influence is once again a topic of discussion as a result of recent events such as the war in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, and the suppression of a popular revolt in Hong Kong. After a brief period of progress, the more liberal aspects of the international system are once again obstructed. This includes the International Criminal Court, the Responsibility to Protect, and the Human Rights Council.


It is anticipated that the level of competitiveness between the world's major nations would remain at an equally high level during the next decade. But what steps can we take to stop these disputes from escalating into a global war? And what steps can be taken to assure even the most basic degree of economic and political collaboration, which is so desperately required if we are to address the major challenges that mankind is now facing?


In Berlin, one often hears the argument that it is now even more vital to establish democracy and human rights across the globe by forceful measures. However, after the tragedy that occurred in Kabul, liberal centrists such as Joe Biden and Emmanuel Macron said that the era of "humanitarian intervention" had come to an end. If an isolationist nationalist with Trump's ideology were to win the election for president, either in Washington, London, or Paris, it would be impossible to maintain the liberal order of the globe. Therefore, there is a possibility that the Germans would run out of friends for their value-oriented foreign policy.


On the other hand, there are more than enough allies in the capitals of western nations to pursue a more aggressive strategy against the authoritarian "system adversaries" China and Russia. On the other hand, as seen by the international community's response to the Russian invasion, the rest of the world is not particularly interested in a fresh round of conflict between democracies and autocracies. There is less sympathy for Russian or Chinese concepts of order than there is for decades of pent-up frustration with the "American empire." However, behind the sometimes bizarre applause for Russia's attack on Ukraine's right to self-determination and territorial integrity - values shared mostly by smaller countries - there is less sympathy for Russian or Chinese concepts of order.

Because many people in the Global South saw the so-called "liberal global order" as more of a pretext for military intervention, structural adjustment programs, and moral lessons than as a promise it held for them, the phrase "liberal world order" It is quite possible that it will finally click for Westerners that they are geopolitically reliant on the assistance of undemocratic regimes, ranging from the monarchies of the Gulf to Turkey, Singapore to Vietnam, and everywhere in between. It is detrimental to engage in language that depicts the battle of democracies versus authoritarian nations. But if Western nations, including the United States, abandoned up on the idea that democracy and human rights should be universal, what would be left of the liberal international order?

Thucydides, an ancient Greek philosopher, was well aware that conflict between declining and rising great nations often leads to battles of epic proportions. When the Pax Americana comes to an end, will it be followed by a time of chaos that is characterized by wars, coups, and revolutions?


Supporters of the concept of a multipolar symphony of great powers may be found not just in Moscow and Beijing, but also in Washington. There are existing models of club governance that are in place, and they range from the G7 all the way up to the G20. These systems allow the big nations to coordinate their interests. Recognizing exclusive spheres of influence may contribute to the moderation of disputes. On the other hand, there is reason to be concerned that democracy and respect for human rights would be sidelined throughout these negotiations. This system of little collaboration is simply not sustainable in light of the issues that are now confronting mankind, which include climate change, migration, and pandemics.


The European Union, which is founded on juridification and negotiation, is likely to be the source of the biggest difficulties for such a wolf world. Some individuals, not only in Moscow, entertain fantasies of a neo-imperial policy that restricts the rights of less powerful peoples to exercise their right to self-determination. This nightmare scenario, which has planned tyranny on the inside and never-ending proxy warfare on the outside, is disturbingly reminiscent of the dystopian novel 1984 by George Orwell. One can only hold out hope that Russian neo-imperialism will fail to gain traction in the muck of the conflict in Ukraine.


China's government is on high alert as a result of Russia's recognition of provinces of a sovereign state that have declared independence. Who can say for certain that Taiwan won't announce its independence the day after tomorrow? At the very least in terms of rhetoric, China is moving back toward its historic stance, which places an emphasis on national sovereignty and condemns colonial meddling. Beijing is having open discussions about whether China should really withdraw behind a new Iron Curtain with the weakened pariah Russia or whether it would not benefit much more from a multilateral world order. These discussions are taking place in front of the eyes of a world public that is astounded.

Where does this so-called "Chinese multilateralism" come from? On the one hand, there is a dedication to international law, global commerce, and collaboration in order to find solutions to important human problems. These problems range from the preservation of the environment to the protection of trade routes to the maintenance of peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, collaboration should take place only within the framework of institutions in which China may have an equal voice in decision-making alongside the United States of America. That translates to a positive response from the United Nations Security Council, but a negative one from the International Monetary Fund. Either the present international institutions should be modified to Chinese ideals of order, or they should be replaced by other organizations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Alternatively, both of these options should be considered. If China's demands are not taken into consideration, Beijing still has the option of forming its own geopolitical bloc with Russia, which is its junior partner. Multilateral and rule-based cooperation is likely to continue under such an illiberal (partial) international system. On the other hand, democracy and human rights are rendered irrelevant since they no longer play a role.

It could be worthwhile to try to reach a consensus with China in order to avoid this from happening. Because an aggressive Russia cannot be stopped if it is pushed into the arms of China, which is why this must be avoided. To the contrary, Beijing is one of the most important factors in bringing an end to the fighting in Ukraine. To do this, however, many people in the West would need to turn around and go the other way. Because former German Naval Chief Schonbach was not the only one who wanted to work together with Russia in the Cold War against system foe China.



But even if China and the United States manage to put their differences from the Cold War behind them for the time being, a post-liberal international order would still present Western nations with insurmountable challenges. Is the right of peoples to self-determination a necessary condition for lasting peace? Is collaboration on human rights concerns only conceivable if one gives up on the idea that human rights should be universal? Or, do we still have a duty to safeguard when crimes against humanity are perpetrated in the zones of influence that are controlled by our competitors? These concerns are relevant to the West's traditional conception of its own identity.

The major nations and their allies engage in intense power conflicts in order to determine which form of order will eventually emerge victorious. On the other hand, the coalitions that come together under the banner of the various models of order are highly distinct from one another. Under the banner of democracy, only a small group of Western governments and a select group of Indo-Pacific value partners will be able to form an alliance. In the event that this Western-led coalition is victorious in its fight to maintain the liberal international order, the result may be an illiberal world order with prominent Chinese influences.

On the other hand, the protection of international law, in particular the inviolability of borders, the right to self-defense, and multilateral cooperation within a framework that is based on rules and has the United Nations at its center, is in the interests of both democratic and authoritarian states. Therefore, it is more probable that support will be found across the ideological camps for an alliance that promotes multilateralism. It is also not impossible to imagine a loose collaboration based on shared interests. With these kinds of hybrid partners, for instance, it would be possible to work together to preserve the environment while still engaging in severe economic competition. Therefore, there are a lot of good arguments in favor of not making the fundamental conflict that exists between democracies and autocracies the focal point of alliance strategy.



Germany's political future can only be secured within the context of a unified Europe, and its economic future can only be secured inside a global free market. Both of these goals need the establishment of a multilateral, rules-based international system. Anyone who believes that a "UN light" scenario is unlikely in light of the new system rivalry should keep in mind that it was entirely possible to cooperate within the framework of a rule-based order based on common interests even at the height of the Cold War. This fact should be recalled by anyone who believes that such a scenario is unlikely.



The outcomes of this restricted kind of multilateralism were not at all negative, as seen by the treaties governing weapons control and the prohibition on the use of ozone-depleting CFCs, as well as the CSCE Final Act in Helsinki. That could be the greatest possible outcome, taking into consideration the problems that mankind is now experiencing, such as protecting the environment, migrating, and being hungry. Because what is at risk is nothing less than the foundations of peace, freedom, and prosperity in Europe, and this is why the stakes are so high.
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