While the Ukraine war starkly exposes the cost of conventional combat, non-military techniques in conflict are gaining popularity.
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When it comes to the phrase "weaponization of everything," there is no one hundred percent appropriate equivalent in German. However, it is self-explanatory in that it is concerned with extending the fighting zone well beyond the capabilities of military instruments of conflict. Mark Galeotti's new book Weaponisation of Everything is subtitled "A Field Guide for the New Type of Combat," and it is instantly evident that traditional military warfare plays just a supporting role in this work.
In the opening section of his book, he explains why he did this. It is surprising how crucial it is today for governments to avoid a direct military confrontation or escalation, even if they seem to be acting "belligerently." This is true even if they appear to be acting "belligerently." Even more autocratic governments would become more anxious as a result of the financial and political consequences of militarily waged interstate conflicts.
Anyone who, in light of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, now wishes to remove the book – which was published before the conflict – from the reading list on the grounds that it is allegedly out of current with reality is committing a grave error. However, Galeotti's point is not that such battles will never occur again, but rather that they will become more infrequent.
Only future historians will be able to determine whether or not this notion is right, although it is still a possibility: A conventional war against Ukraine, on the one hand, displays in the most graphic manner the enormous costs - military, political, diplomatic, and social - that everyone concerned bears while fighting a conventional war. The author, on the other hand, demonstrates unequivocally that, even in the face of presumed overwhelming military supremacy, it is far from assured that one's own political objectives can be realized even in the most distant of ways by an aggressive campaign.
Galeotti's major theme is played to a familiar song in the second and third sections of the book: places with strong international linkages would become the new battlegrounds of "wars without violence," as Galeotti describes them. The logic underlying this oxymoron is widely known: it is in accord with the spirit of Mark Leonard's equally recent book The Age of Unpeace, which was published in the same year. The European Council on Foreign Relations published a Power Atlas: Seven Battlegrounds of the Connected World that details how connection might lead to war.
All three correctly point out that we must take the instrumentalization of mutual dependence in a networked world outside the traditional military very seriously, and that we must take this very seriously. However, it seems to be questionable if looking at the situation through the "war glasses" selected by all three would be beneficial. The reason for this is that non-military tools are often used precisely because one does not want to engage in a "real" conflict.
As a matter of fact, Galeotti is quite suspicious about this phrase as well. Early on in his book, he goes through a number of different words, ranging from "hybrid conflict" to "wars in the gray region" to "non-linear warfare," all of which he finds to be harmful in the long run. Consequently, the issue arises as to why all of the non-military means of exerting pressure and influence clearly articulated by Galeotti should be categorised a priori under the headings "war" and "weapons"? Even if non-military methods are utilized in conjunction with military means in a militarily controlled conflict, the conflict is still classified as a war. Moreover, even in cases when entirely non-military measures achieve the same result as an armed assault, it is reasonable that war language be used, such as in the case of the September 11th terrorist attacks. However, referring to a conflict in which no physical violence is utilized at all does not seem to be particularly useful. Rather than being targeted by nuclear-tipped missiles, Galeotti says he would rather to be caught in the crosshairs of "troubling memes."
Three sections of the book that are especially relevant to the present debate concerning a German national security policy should be highlighted for consideration in the context of this debate:
Corruption and organized crime are often utilized to exert influence on governments. Galeotti says that intelligent security policy must be implemented in response to this. In the case of terrorist funding, for example, very sophisticated measures for combating money laundering have been created and are being implemented. However, this was only applied to this particular area of money laundering at the time.
Galaotti likewise offers a very conflicted image of international law in his book. His starting point is first and foremost its instrumentalization: from defamation lawsuits to suppress unwelcome criticism at home and abroad, to Interpol Red Notices to prosecute members of the opposition, to flimsy justifications under international law for behavior that is obviously in violation of international law, and everything in between.
However, in the case of the latter in particular, it is once again stated that the law plays a role even for those who are exceedingly revisionist in their views. More attention should be devoted to this area precisely because international law is contentious and all governments are attempting to exploit it for their own ends. Alternatively, in the words of Galeotti: "Even if it is so simple to trash courts and jurists, one should play the role of these borelords" and not belittle their importance. When it comes to "containing the excesses of criminals, kleptocrats, dictators, and terrorists," your role is critical.
At the end, he correctly points out that, due to the constant stream of new military technologies, nations are confronted with tough dilemmas about how to allocate their limited budgetary resources among the many competing priorities. Inertia forces in departments, authorities, and branches of the armed services, all of which seek to protect and extend their budgets, are hostile to the need for a flexible and inventive security strategy. For larger countries that attempted to cover all bases, however, "it may be quickly discovered that having the most modern fighter jet or superior soft power makes little difference if the infrastructure is vulnerable to hackers, the political elite is vulnerable to bribery, and outsiders' influence is widespread."
Galeotti concludes his book by citing the positive example of the integrated examination of security, defense, development, and foreign policy in the United Kingdom, which resulted in rational prioritizing of security, defense, development, and foreign policy priorities. And this takes us full circle to the discussion of Germany's proposed national security plan.
In reality, though, it makes a great deal of sense to take a decisive step farther than Galeotti at this stage and not only settle with having a competent approach. Because if the strategic goals are not represented in the entire budget, the strategy will be rendered ineffective, as previously said. It is also worthwhile to look at the United Kingdom in this regard, since the current Spending Review allows for just this kind of comparison between strategy and budget planning. When it comes to national security strategy, Malcolm Chalmers of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) demonstrates how a paper like this might be studied productively.
Additionally, the instrument of expenditure reviews, sometimes known as topic-related budget evaluations, is not unfamiliar in Germany. Although it seems to have been utilized on a much smaller scale in the past, it appears to have been employed more recently. Hopefully, this will change in the future. Furthermore, the chance is favorable: It will be decided what will be the subject of the next expenditure review cycle when the cabinet makes its decision on the federal budget for 2023 on June 22. In light of the present debates about the turning point, special assets, and national security policy, the next budget review must be a strategic exercise in order to be effective.
The author Marius Müller-Hennig is a German security and international policy expert.