While crises have exposed vulnerabilities in the EU's structure, they have also sparked significant advances toward unification. Will war be followed by geopolitical sovereignty?
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| [Europe geopolitical sovereignty illustration /EUROPEANS24] |
In light of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, at the very least, no one dared to talk of the "hour of Europe." Former Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos made a speech on the commencement of war in the former Yugoslavia, which, in hindsight, seems to have been woefully out of step with the time of the event. Josep Borrell, the EU's high representative for foreign affairs, is now warning that Europe is entering its "darkest hour," while also expressing hope for the "delayed development of a geopolitical EU." His optimism is based on the remarkable solidarity of the European countries and the United States, as well as the strong package of sanctions against Russia that has been put in place as a result of this unity.
Borrell embodies the fundamental faith held by many committed Europeans, who believe that the growth of the EU will proceed in the manner of a pendulum swing. Considering the situation from this perspective, every crisis represents a setback for the Union, to which the coalition of nations reacts by making progress toward integration. Every crisis signifies the beginning of the next stage toward a more connected EU. Following the European Union's failure to intervene in Yugoslavia, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and subsequently the Common Security and Defense Policy, were established. The European Stability Mechanism and the Fiscal Pact were two of the measures used to respond to the euro crisis. Other instruments were also used. Following the summer 2015 migration crisis, the EU responded by providing emergency assistance to affected Member States, upgrading Frontex, and signing controversial agreements with border or origin countries, through which the EU effectively outsourced migration and avoided further internal disputes.
As a response to the epidemic, the ambitious NextGenEU financing package was launched, which is also meant to assist the EU in its transition to a more environmentally friendly economy. It was even possible to find a solution to the issue provided by right-wing populist and authoritarian governments inside the EU, such as those in Poland and Hungary, by requiring that a portion of the money be spent in accordance with international human rights norms. So far, it's been a little perplexing. According to this reasoning, the majority acceptance of the EU's new strategic compass in March 2022, as well as the use of funding from the European Peace Facility for armament transfers to Ukraine, mark the beginning of the era of a "geopolitical European Union."
However, what is absent from this narrative are the fractures and rifts that have developed inside the EU – sometimes across groupings of nations – as a result of these crises and which will continue to impede the Union's progress in the future. Individual sediments are heaped on top of one another to represent the advancements in integration, to use a metaphorical expression. Every sediment, on the other hand, has weak areas or even holes, which combine to form an unstable whole. It is clear that the aspirations of strategic EU sovereignty, as articulated in the German coalition agreement, or even more extended strategic autonomy, as described by re-elected French President Emmanuel Macron, are doomed.
Three specific examples may be used to demonstrate what this looks like in practice. First and foremost, the development of European security and defense policy has always had a weak point: the division between countries with a strong transatlantic orientation, such as Poland or the United Kingdom, and those who support a more independent European Union in terms of foreign and defense policy. In this instance, though, being independent meant playing a minor part from the beginning. Essentially, the EU's security policy was created to work inside a functional, liberal international system while also taking on modest stabilizing roles within that order, as outlined above. In the next years, the split between the two sides resulted in repeated arguments regarding the division of work between the EU and NATO, which, although creating a plethora of formulaic concessions, failed to make any significant headway on the issue. Developing devices such as the EU Battle Groups, which were marketed as a huge development but were never used, allowed the EU to save its own skin.
Because of Russia's hostility, there is an opportunity to close the transatlantic chasm that exists. During his tenure as Secretary General of NATO, he highlighted the irreplaceability of American deterrent powers for the security of Europe. The US administration under Joe Biden is providing a benign boost to the development of better European security since the United States will be concentrating more on China. A strengthening of European security strategy might have practical benefits for both the EU and NATO, as well as for the European pillar in the alliance. However, it must then be tailored to the new security (dis)order in Europe, rather than just continuing along the route that has already been paved in the previous decades. If this window of opportunity is passed up and either a resurgent Donald Trump or Trump himself takes over as President of the United States in 2024, Europe might be left holding the bag.
Second, the euro crisis has eroded confidence in European cooperation and exposed major divisions between Europe's southern and northern regions. The solely economic orientation, which was principally supported at the time by German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, has resulted in two events that are putting into doubt Europe's strategic sovereignty. There is, on the one hand, Europe's strategic blindness. On the other side, there is the United States. Because, in order to balance its budgets, countries like as Greece were compelled to sell its silverware to anybody who would buy it. Consequently, the fifth-largest European port of Piraeus now belongs to a state-owned Chinese corporation, while the port of Thessaloniki now belongs to a Russian-born businessman who is reported to have links with the Donbas rebels. The invitation was extended at the cost of European partners to competitors or even adversaries in order for them to seize control of European strategic assets while at the same time preventing European unity. It is possible for them to influence the decisions of the European Council if they apply pressure to the countries that rely on their investments.
This historical experience, along with the fear that the Stability and Growth Pact would be read strictly in the future, is the second deep trauma of the euro crisis. The first deep trauma occurred during the financial crisis. Since an unified economic strategy is only achievable to a limited degree and European investments are only engaged during times of crisis, European solidarity will remain weak as long as these conditions persist. As a result, the next stage must be the continued growth of the eurozone into a more economically and financially connected organization.
Third, the migrant problem, and particularly the unwillingness of the Eastern European member states to find a single solution to it, has created profound fissures in the foundations of their societies. With the increasingly illiberal restructuring of the political systems in Poland and Hungary, they have contributed to the perception that these governments are not interested in actively participating in the development of European integration, but only in the European "meat pots", that is, in the financial resources provided by the European Union (EU). In the case of Poles, this is a far more pronounced impression. It inhibits the nation from playing a prominent position in the EU, such as that envisioned by the Weimar Triangle concept, which establishes a connection between the Franco-German engine and Central Europe by bringing them together. After taking into consideration the somewhat anti-German rhetoric of the Polish administration as well as the desire for closer ties with President Trump, it becomes clear that the authorities in Warsaw are not interested in strengthening the EU. With Poland's demand for unity in the face of Ukraine's refugee influx, and above all with the closeness of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to the Putin government, the divide between the two countries may be mended, at least with regard to Warsaw. However, this can only be successful if the disintegration of the judiciary is remedied, and if Poland truly embraces and implements the EU's norms on the rule of law and human rights. The Biden administration's apparently clearly ideologically inspired urge for an unification of democracies against autocracies might serve as a further impetus for Warsaw to join the alliance.
This imperfect and fuzzy depiction of the EU's broken and shattered society makes it apparent why there were reservations about imposing harsh sanctions on Russia before the conflict broke out in Ukraine. At the same time, though, he makes it apparent that the EU is now confronted with a significant obstacle. It must not only overcome the present crisis and take the appropriate lessons from it, but it must also bridge the gaps that have opened up in order to stabilize its own power to influence political affairs. This also implies that there will be difficult disputes that will not be appeased by formulaic concessions. This basically involves an open and honest debate regarding graded types of integration, such as those already in place in the euro zone. The re-election of Macron and the German government, which is still in its early stages of administration, provide a window of opportunity, as does the mounting strain of the global economic and financial crises. That would truly mark the beginning of the era of a geopolitically independent EU at that time.
The author Christos Katsioulis runs the Regional Office for Cooperation and Peace of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Vienna.