The turning point that occurred as a consequence of the Ukraine conflict affected more than just Germany. However, collaboration and peacekeeping are also required in the new international order.
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| [Role of EU in Ukraine War] |
The year 2022 will go down in history as a watershed moment in European history, possibly even as a watershed moment in time. With the launch of the Russian attack against Ukraine on February 24, a profound paradigm change in European security and peace order – and, perhaps, in the global and economic order – was signaled. The ruins of Mikhail Gorbachev's "common home," as well as the accompanying notion of cooperative and communal security in Europe, remain before Europe just thirty years after the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the signing of the Charter of Paris. Putin's invasion calls into question a slew of previously held beliefs and assumptions.
Germany's position and expectations in Europe and the rest of the globe were drastically altered as a result of the war. The "watershed moment" referred to by Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz in his government announcement on February 27 is evidence of this new reality. Therefore, the Federal Republic of Germany will allocate two percent of its gross domestic product to military expenditures going forward. An additional 100 billion euros will be allocated to the "Special Fund for the Federal Armed Forces," which is guaranteed by the Basic Law and will be established as part of the federal budget. In addition, the federal government is providing Ukraine with self-defense weaponry and has pledged the continuation of collaborative European arms initiatives in the next years. It is obvious from the scope of these actions that we are presently seeing a significant paradigm change in German foreign and security policy.
The urgent necessity for a strategic discussion on the specific execution and consequences of the "turning point" in German foreign and security policy, apart from these historical choices, cannot be overstated. What the Bundeswehr can and should do within the framework of the European Union and the NATO military alliance becomes an issue as a result of these developments. A rise in military budget alone does not imply an increase in overall security levels. In sum, the EU member states have already spent more than 200 billion euros on weaponry, which is more than four times the amount spent by the Russian Federation. European military capabilities fall substantially behind those of other nations, owing to a lack of interoperability and duplication among the European armed forces, as well as poor use of limited resources, notwithstanding these efforts.
As a result of Russia's invasion, the EU has regained its former unity and imposed the most comprehensive package of sanctions ever enacted by it. Aside from that, the EU is supplying defensive weaponry to a crisis region for the first time in its history. In the past, shocking events such as the Ukraine conflict have often served as a spur for further integration inside the European Union. The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Defense Review (CARD), and the European Defense Fund (EDF) were all established after Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014. With the approval of the Strategic Compass as the Union's new core security policy statement in March of this year, the EU took yet another significant step forward in the direction of improved collaboration in the fields of security and defense. A key element of the Strategic Compass is the formation of an EU intervention force, which is expected to be operational by 2025, among other initiatives. Defense Minister Lambrecht has previously said that the Bundeswehr would furnish the bulk of the quick response force's personnel during the first year of its existence.
This was a significant signal to our European allies, indicating that Germany is prepared to assume more responsibility within the framework of the EU's unified security and defense policy, which is expected to be operational by the year 2025. Defense Minister Lambrecht has previously said that the Bundeswehr would furnish the bulk of the quick response force's personnel during the first year of its existence. This was a significant signal to our European allies, indicating that Germany is prepared to assume more responsibility within the framework of the EU's unified security and defense policy, which is expected to be operational by the year 2025. Defense Minister Lambrecht has previously said that the Bundeswehr would furnish the bulk of the quick response force's personnel during the first year of its existence. Germany's readiness to assume more responsibilities within the framework of the EU's shared security and defense policy served as an essential signal to our European allies.
The capacity of NATO to forge partnerships, on the other hand, remains to be a significant factor in maintaining European security. As a result of Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, alliance defense has progressively risen to the forefront of our national security strategy. With his actions in Ukraine, Russian President Putin, of all persons, put an end to NATO's long-running crisis of purpose and existence and made a key contribution to the alliance's rejuvenation. Recent statements by US President Barack Obama and French President Emmanuel Macron characterized NATO as "obsolete" and "brain dead." Today, on the other hand, the West has never been more unified than it is now, some two decades after the end of the Cold War. Even formerly neutral governments are now evaluating whether or not to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Without a doubt, it is a stroke of historical good fortune that the United States is being led by a President who personifies collaboration with Europe more than anybody else. This historic occasion should be taken advantage of in order to strengthen and improve the reliability of the transatlantic cooperation. The Europeans, on the other hand, should not be under any illusions: the new Russian threat demonstrates, once again, how heavily reliant Europe is on the United States for its security assurances. The reduction of this reliance will continue to be a significant issue for Europe in the coming years. Because, even if the United States has re-established its position as a founding member of the Western alliance, Europe must not forget the hard lessons of the Trump administration and seek for greater strategic autonomy.
Eastern Europe's civil war will not distract attention from the reality that the hegemonic struggle between America and China for a future global order will continue to be the focal point of US foreign policy. In recent years, we have seen the deterioration of international political laws and conventions, as well as a return to traditional great power and geopolitical dynamics — whether in the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, the African continent, or Eastern Europe. Russian President Vladimir Putin's campaign on Ukraine is unquestionably the greatest significant attack on the free and rules-based global order that has taken place to date. It is undeniable that we are in the midst of a transitional period leading to the establishment of a new global power structure.
The shape of the future international order is still up in the air, but a closer study at the two votes on Russia's invasion of Ukraine that took place in the United Nations General Assembly on March 2nd and March 24th may already give some indications. In both resolutions, a resounding majority of UN member states voted to denounce Russia's actions in Ukraine (141 and 140). Belarus, Eritrea, North Korea, Russia, and Syria were the only nations who voted against one other. 35 or 38 nations abstained, including several authoritarian regimes such as China, but also India, which is the world's biggest democracy and the world's largest democracy by population. Russia and Syria are two of the world's most powerful countries. 35 or 38 nations abstained, including several authoritarian regimes such as China, but also India, which is the world's biggest democracy and the world's largest democracy by population. Russia and Syria are two of the world's most powerful countries. 35 or 38 nations abstained, including several authoritarian regimes such as China, but also India, which is the world's biggest democracy and the world's largest democracy by population.
In all, the countries that did not categorically denounce Russia's assault account for half of the world's population, according to the UN. If you include the countries that criticised Russia but did not support the Western sanctions, the total number of people on the planet approaches two-thirds of the world's total population. The fact that the vast majority of these nations are physically situated on the Eurasian continent and in Africa along China's "New Silk Road" should be noted. Although there has been much worldwide condemnation, the Chinese leadership has yet to express its opposition to the Russian incursion. Contrary to this, it was only in February that Moscow and Beijing renewed their "unending friendship" and signed a comprehensive collaboration deal between the two nations.
Russia seems to be being pushed even more into a one-sided reliance on China, both politically and economically, as a result of the conflict. The Chinese government, on the other hand, may take advantage of Russia's reliance on them to extend its sphere of influence into the former Soviet nations of Central Asia. However, China faces significant dangers as a result of the war: Contrary to its own foreign policy goals, China has already lost huge amounts of credibility as a future shaping force for the evolution of the international order as a result of its prior hazy approach toward Russia's war of aggression.
Aside from China's influence, the reasons and goals of the countries that support Russia - or at the very least do not denounce it - are quite varied: they vary from strategic and economic interests and dependencies, historical links, to anti-Western reflexes, among other things. For the time being, it is necessary to point out that the evolving international order cannot be reduced to a simple contest between liberal democracies and autocracies. The power-political lines of conflict and differing interests of the different nations seem to be far more complicated than previously thought, indicating that international relations will be volatile in the near future.
An examination of history reveals that periods of power-political upheaval are often characterized by instability and vulnerability to crises. In 1989/1990, the East-West war came to a peaceful conclusion, thanks in part to Willy Brandt's peace and détente policies, as well as a year-long negotiating process within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This was one of the rare exceptions (CSCE). The agreements and organizations in question are exactly those that are today inflicting immense harm to Russia. Under Putin's leadership, it is very unlikely that stable ties with Russia can ever be re-established again. The European order will most likely be set over the next several years, if not decades, by a period of conflict, or at the at least of coexistence, between the various European powers.
While this may be true, the term "turning moment" should not be exclusive to the military. The conflict in Ukraine does not diminish the necessity for a comprehensive security concept that not only considers military issues, but also political, economic, ecological, and humanitarian considerations, among other things. The conflict in Ukraine, like the Corona crisis before it, has once again brought to light the dangers associated with increasing reliance on certain supply chains - whether in the domain of energy supplies from Russia or the technology infrastructure of China. Shortly put, the EU must increase its collective sovereignty and resilience in the face of strategically significant political, economic, and technical challenges.
At the same time, it is critical to begin thinking about how a European security order may be rebuilt in the future as soon as possible. The apparent conclusion is that under Putin, a restoration to the pre-crisis status quo is no longer viable. However, sooner or later, you will be forced to engage in new negotiations with the Kremlin for European security. For the foreseeable future, however, security can only be provided against Russia, and not with Russia itself as before. However, this does not rule out the possibility that the lessons learned from the detente strategy may continue to be important in other parts of the globe in the future. On the contrary, in light of the monumental challenges that mankind faces, such as climate change, poverty alleviation, pandemic preparedness, and migration, international cooperation and peacekeeping continue to be necessary, even in a rapidly changing world.
The author Dr. Rolf Mützenich has been chairman of the SPD parliamentary group since 2019. He has been a member of the Bundestag since 2002.