The Central Intelligence Agency and many private experts feel that the possibility that the Kremlin, embarrassed by its defeats in Ukraine, would not fire a nuclear weapon in the country should not be dismissed lightly.
The possibility that the Kremlin may unleash a nuclear weapon on Ukraine should not be taken lightly. Williams Burns, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, gave this disturbing warning on Thursday evening.
"Given the military failures they have endured so far, it is likely that President Putin and the Russian leadership could succumb to despair." The danger presented by the possible deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons is one that no one should underestimate, he warned in an address to the Georgia State University community.
Since the beginning of the Ukrainian invasion, a number of observers have raised the same concern about the possibility that Vladimir Putin thinks he has his "back against the wall" or that he has nothing left to lose. In a recent interview with the Carnegie Center's James Acton, the expert on nuclear issues expressed concern that Vladimir Putin, who had been defeated militarily in Ukraine and even humiliated in front of the Russian people, was employing tactical nuclear bombs - which are only slightly more powerful than the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima and a thousand times less powerful than so-called strategic weapons that can annihilate an entire region. The goal is to "terrify everyone while still winning the case."
James Acton, on the other hand, is quick to point out that "we haven't gotten there yet." Since Moscow confirmed the activation of nuclear weapons two days after the commencement of the Ukrainian incursion, William Burns says, "we haven't really seen any tangible indicators of change." No public comment by a Russian official has suggested that the Kremlin's nuclear policy, which regards nuclear use as a last option only if Russia's fundamental interests are under jeopardy, may be changing.
According to Admiral Jean-Louis Lozier, an expert from the French Institute of International Relations, the difficulty is that no one can definitively define what these essential interests are for the simple reason that a certain amount of ambiguity "lies at the core of nuclear deterrence." "You should never establish a red line since doing so would give the enemy the authority to do whatever below that line." When it comes to a deterrent weapon that is expected never to be utilised, it is nonetheless vital that its deployment stay plausible under particular conditions that are carefully veiled in skillful ambiguity. According to Dmitry Medvedev, the Russian Security Council's Deputy Chairman, Russia's primary interest in maintaining Ukraine's presence in its sphere of influence is one of its most important objectives. Is the essential, on the other hand, absolutely necessary?
Russian strategists have also proposed a concept known as "escalation decompression," which would include first deploying a tactical nuclear bomb on the battlefield to scare a foe and then utilising a strategic nuclear weapon in order to reclaim an edge should a confrontation arise. conventional. This ideology is only designed to be used in the case of a direct war with the Alliance, according to its creators. But could the Kremlin apply it to the conflict in Ukraine, in which the West is participating but not a belligerent force in the conflict? According to the theory of "the deterrent of the insane in the strong" advanced by former American President Richard Nixon, Vladimir Putin's power has shown that, by invading Ukraine, he dared to do a crime that few imagined was conceivable.
Nonetheless, deploying this threat in this context, as the Kremlin hinted at just after the start of the invasion, would represent a sea change in the international "grammar" of deterrence: it would no longer be a question of preventing another country from invading you, but rather of preventing a neighbour and its allies from resisting your own invasion. As a result, nuclear weapons have shifted from a defensive to an offensive mode of deterrence. However, Russian nuclear deterrence has already persuaded NATO not to commit its forces to battle in Ukraine as a result of its nuclear arsenal.
There would also most likely be phases and last warnings before to the use of nuclear power, for example, by the deployment of chemical weapons or, more substantially, thermobaric missiles (with a destructive force of up to 0.2 kt but no radiation).
Nonetheless, the deployment of a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine would be a tragedy... not just for the Ukrainian people, but also for the Russian government. First and foremost, it would detract from the narrative of an operation that went according to plan and was successful. It would also demolish the Kremlin's illusion that Russians and Ukrainians "form a single people belonging to the same historical and spiritual space," since it would then be a matter of bombing a component of the Russian people that was apparently representative of the Russian people. Let alone the danger of radioactive fallout in Russia.
Also, Russia may be able to force the Ukrainian army to surrender, but it would be branded an international pariah as a result. In particular, this very disruptive step for the international order would almost certainly result in the loss of support from China, which is the United States' primary and practically only significant partner.
For a final note, even if Vladimir Putin decides to "push the red button," as the cliché goes, he would still want the cooperation of two other leaders who have nuclear codes in common with him: the Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu and the Chief of the General Staff, Valeri Guerasimov.
Westerners seem to be drawing a tight crest line with the president of the United States of America's speech: to assist Ukraine in repelling the Russian army without putting pressure on Moscow by defeating them in a fair and timely manner...