America's pivot to Asia, Donald Trump's impending return to the White House: Europeans cannot continue to rely on the United States as they have in the past.
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| [Eurofighter Typhoon in German airbase] |
Vladimir Putin believed he could split the West and that NATO would not respond to his aggression against Ukraine, according to US President Joe Biden in his State of the Union address. "Putin was incorrect. "We are prepared." However, certain mundane circumstances stand in the way of his allegiance commitments.
On the eve of the Russian invasion, two out of every three Americans couldn't find Ukraine on a map. In the run-up to Russia's assault, the majority of the US populace requested that the US remain out of Ukraine discussions.
Even after Putin's attack on his neighbouring nation, Biden's countrymen did not rally with him - the customary patriotic rallying impact of the "rally around the flag" was mostly absent.
The US focuses primarily on China
There is just one topic on which everyone agrees: no American soldier will sacrifice his life for Ukraine. Kyiv will not become a satellite city of Kabul. Anyone who is aware of these realities should be aware that the transatlantic solidarity recently proclaimed at the Munich Security Conference does not have to continue.
Russia's unlawful invasion on Ukraine disrupted the world's rule-based order and, as a result, the foundations of German and European foreign policy. America's strategic pivot to Asia, Biden's leadership weakness, and the looming return of Putin ally Donald Trump to the White House should finally awaken people on the Old Continent to the fact that, despite Washington's current involvement in the Ukraine crisis, we Europeans can no longer stand by and watch.
Even before the quick exit from Afghanistan, the international power appeared damaged. Furthermore, the United States has long been focused on the century's battle with China - which has also become a military foe - as well as its own national interests. As a result, Europe should finally strive toward self-defense.
It is encouraging that the federal government is spending more in our security. Washington has long warned that it intends to spend at least 2% of GDP on the military in the future. Furthermore, there is a special fund of 100 billion euros, which should not be used exclusively to pay homage to the US's weak pledge of security. Rather, the funds must be spent in our own military capabilities, as well as in European technical and industrial know-how.
Berlin and Paris must work together to build a vision for a united European security strategy
The federal government should adhere to the Franco-German position as a driving force for core Europe, with all initiatives available to other European countries. It requires a driving force since the security policy road towards a defence union – which was previously followed in the early 1950s but then stalled due to a veto by the French National Assembly – will not proceed in lockstep, especially given the necessity to overcome self- and international blockades.
After all, in the 2019 Aachen Treaty, Berlin and Paris agreed on a single foreign and security strategy. The pact stipulates that tight coordination between the weapons industry is required to promote military cooperation and pave the road for a European defence union.
In light of Putin's historic intervention, the joyous remarks must be followed by deeds: Berlin and Paris must devise a vision for a single European security policy.
In terms of weapons industry collaboration, Europe could, for example, handle the planned Future Combat Air System (FCAS), which is designed to replace the obsolete Eurofighter and Rafale combat aircraft, on its own - even if the costs are in the hundreds of billions of dollars.
To avoid ending up in political cloud cuckoo land, the formerly competing German and French corporations' economic interests must first be balanced. Without a reinforced Berlin-Paris axis and pan-European financial cooperation incentives for other nations' arms sectors, the FCAS cannot be ruled out.
Washington wants Europeans to spend more money on American weapons
In contrast, Washington is unlikely to be interested in the success of European arms efforts and defence organisations. After all, if the FCAS initiative is successful, Europe will lessen not just its military but also its technical reliance on the US, thereby strengthening its own sovereignty. Washington wants the Europeans to spend more money on military spending, particularly on American weapons. The US political-military establishment does not like it when its friends become technologically self-sufficient.
This is especially evident when replacing German Tornado fighter planes, which Washington explicitly relates to the power problem of "nuclear sharing." At an emergency, Berlin would most likely be unable to utilise the Eurofighter to transfer the tactical US nuclear weapons stationed in Büchel, and would be forced to purchase an American weapon system in order to remain under the US nuclear umbrella.
Finally, as long as the federal government seeks nuclear sharing, decision-making over Germany's national security is delegated to the respective occupant in the White House. At the same time, it provides him with significant leverage, which is increasingly being utilised to profit on the political promise of protection, both economically and politically.
The controversial subject of nuclear involvement should be resolved as soon as feasible with the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance: With Biden's projected limiting of nuclear deterrence to purely nuclear threats - the USA's so-called "Sole Purpose" approach - the European NATO members would be forced to establish their own. Rethink deterrence approach in the face of non-nuclear threats.
A Franco-German foreign and security strategy, on the other hand, should include nuclear deterrence. After all, Paris, as it was under President Charles de Gaulle's tenure, is quite willing to include nuclear defence within a broader European policy, i.e. as a European pillar inside NATO. Germany's involvement in the "Force de Frappe" would very certainly provide more security than the United States' "nuclear participation."
If Germany, as Europe's most powerful economy, connected its security policy fate to that of the militarily more powerful France, then, unlike in the past, doubts about Berlin's ambitions to become a great power would be finally dispelled on the Old Continent. That would be a significant psychological contribution to the much-needed European security unification.
The author Josef Braml is a political scientist and Secretary General of the German group of the Trilateral Commission think tank.