On the seventh day of the attack, the Moscow army expanded its use of force, despite the fact that many analysts emphasised the failure of the first phase. Despite a forced march of professionalisation since 2012, the logistical issues never fail to astound.
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| [Kharkiv, Ukraine] |
After a series of more or less targeted assaults, will there be undifferentiated mass bombardments? Beyond Vladimir Putin's strategic goals, experts around the world are wondering after seven days of offensive about the tactics - even the weaknesses - of the Russian army, which had previously been marked by a certain restraint in the use of force, however overwhelming, despite dozens of victims to be mourned.
First, did the Russian General Staff bank on its adversary's swift collapse by hitting with long-range missiles or attacking airborne troops? If this is the case, the failure is evident. Not only is the regular army resisting, but the civilian populace is also on its side, blocking access to metropolitan areas. All of this was aided by the unanimity of Western countries' and public opinion's resistance.
Colonel Michel Goya, a former Marine Corps colonel, emphasises "coordination issues." The Russian army, he believes in the "Figaro," would suffer particularly from gasoline supply issues, causing it to leave a large amount of equipment on the side of the road.
General Stéphane Abrial, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force and NATO's number two, is not shocked, coming from an army used to travelling large distances and staying close to home. "Phoney war," he said. A large number of citizens are seen strolling, riding, or driving near armoured vehicles in the harbour. This logistical breakdown would explain the column's apparent immobility, which spanned more than 60 kilometres north of Kiev. "Without any air defence," he pondered, despite the fact that the Ukrainian air force would have been reduced to nearly nothing.
If the Russian General Staff fails to win swiftly, the prevalent idea is that it will bring into play its historical strong point: heavy artillery. Witness the escalating bombing of Kiev, as well as Kharkiv, the country's second largest city in the northeast, and Mariupol, a crucial port between Crimea and Donbass.
Kiev isn't Grosny or Aleppo
Of course, the risk is that the number of civilian deaths may rise, which is not obvious in a "brotherly" country. If we draw a link between the Russians or their ad hoc friends' annihilation in Chechnya or Syria, Kiev is neither Grosny nor Aleppo.
Will the Russian air force then be persuaded to play a big part in what Moscow refers to as the "second phase" of the special military operation? It is evident, and this is another source of concern, that the Sukhoi have kept pretty quiet since February 24. "I am convinced that the Russians have very good visibility of Ukrainian airspace and that they have weakened their control capabilities," General Abrial analyses, citing several reasons, including fear of collateral damage, portable surface-to-air missiles still in large numbers, and poorly identified or well-hidden targets.
On a tactical level, there is also the issue of Russian soldiers' motivation. Remember that in Russia, military service is mandatory, and conscripts make up a sizable proportion of fighters. Many of them are exempted, but those who threaten to protest are not. Those on the other hand are enrolled against their choice, frequently with brutality, the army having become a tool of state coercion. This might explain some of the "negligence" of the sort of car abandonment filmed by the Ukrainians. Nonetheless, Russia began a massive initiative to professionalise its army in 2012.
According to Moscow, 498 Russian soldiers were killed
For the first time since the invasion, the Ministry of Defense has communicated a report on its losses in men: 498 troops would have been killed, which is 10 times fewer than Kiev estimates of 5,840 slain. The information war continues. According to Moscow, the "military and Ukrainian nationalists" have suffered "2,870 killed and almost 3,700 injured."
Finally, everyone is curious as to where Russia will end. At what point in the takeover of the land would the offers of negotiations become possibly conclusive? Controlling access to the Black Sea is being attempted in the north at Kharkiv, but notably in the south. If the Russian army gains control of Mariupol, it will be able to maintain geographical continuity between its soldiers in Crimea and those in the rebel territory of Donbass farther north.