Meanwhile, Armenia stays in Russia's orbit and Azerbaijan finds itself on the fence between the two.
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While Russia is at war with Ukraine, tensions in the South Caucasus are rising as well. Azerbaijan and Georgia's political and social climates highlight once again how the three nations have evolved since their independence from the Soviet Union more than 30 years ago..
To be clear, Azerbaijan is officially neutral, which is exactly what the Kremlin wants Ukraine to be. The Non-Aligned Movement even has President Ilham Aliyev as its chair. Baku is attempting to counterbalance Russia and Turkey in terms of realpolitik. On the verge of conflict, Baku and Moscow formed a strategic partnership that mirrors the "Shusha Declaration" signed by Ankara and Ankara in the year 2021. Foreign policy coordination with two often competing, sometimes cooperating large regional powers is a risky endeavour for Azerbaijan.
The majority of the people is in favour of the Ukrainians. Solidarity with Ukraine was the focus of a big rally in Baku. The police, who would typically use force to disperse women's protests, accepted her behaviour. Because of Azerbaijan's constant adherence to the idea of "territorial integrity" in its dispute with Armenia over Karabakh since 1988, the country is naturally on the side of Kiev, while the Armenian side stresses the right of the Karabakh Armenians to self-determination. An immediate shipment of 24 tonnes of humanitarian aid for Ukraine was made by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev when he returned from Moscow. Azerbaijan, a major oil-producing country, is attempting to assert its independence from Moscow while gaining more control over its foreign policy.
According to Baku's authoritarian government, the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh was "settled" by the 2020 war: After 44 days of savage combat, large regions formerly held by Armenians were returned to Azerbaijan. The international community did not penalise Turkey's war of aggression, despite the clear violation of international law. During actual hostilities, the EU did not even contemplate halting Azerbaijani energy supply to the EU. Only 5% of the EU's total crude oil imports come from the Caspian Sea nation. Natural gas from Azerbaijan may now reach Italy thanks to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, which was established during World War II. The belief that altering the status quo by military means would be acceptable worldwide may have been enhanced in Moscow as a result of this development. Baku is now expecting to increase its energy exports to the European Union as a result of Western Russia sanctions. The short-term outlook, on the other hand, is bleak.
In the Republic of Armenia the disparity between the Western reactions to the conflicts of 2020 and 2022 is producing a lot of ill will. The "Western double standards" in dealing with countries that violate the peace are regretted with profound compassion for Ukraine's predicament. Armenia's security alliance with Russia is considerably more tightly knit now than it was before its loss in 2020. Thus, the administration stays silent on the conflict in Ukraine. The remnant Armenian population in Karabakh is protected by Russian forces. Azerbaijan is stepping up the pressure in the aftermath of the conflict: More than 100,000 residents in Azerbaijan's Karabakh region have been left without heating after an accident on March 8 shut off the gas supply. They bombarded Armenian communities on a regular basis. Azerbaijani military intimidation measures seem to be intended at convincing the Armenian inhabitants to leave the area.
As a result, a fresh influx of immigrants is making its way to Armenia's capital city of Yerevan, including many Russians with advanced degrees, including journalists, human rights activists, IT professionals, and whole enterprises. A total of 37 Russian planes arrived at Zvartnots Airport in a few of days. There are a number of public and private efforts underway to assist those fleeing persecution in finding work and starting enterprises. Whether or whether this "brain gain" will be able to absorb the predicted reduction in remittances from Armenian migrant workers from Russia remains an issue. Russia's expected economic collapse will have a detrimental impact on the South Caucasus mostly due to labour migration and because Russia is the region's primary export market for many processed goods.
In Georgia, too as of this writing, more than 20,000 Russian immigrants had landed in the United States. Even a petition on Change.org begs for a Russian visa requirement to be reinstated. The argument is that they would be better off remaining in Russia to take against the Kremlin government there. This is a reflection of Georgia's tense relationship with Russia, which dates back to the country's 2008 war with Russia. Many people are concerned that Russia would exploit the existence of a Russian minority as an excuse to attack Tbilisi. Russia has maintained military facilities on the Georgian side of the major Caucasus ridge, around 40 kilometres from Tbilisi, since the "independence" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008.
Overwhelming public support for the Ukrainian people can be seen in the blue and yellow adornment of many establishments, as well as in the frequent large rallies on Rustaveli Prospect. Businesses and people are donating and stocking up on supplies in droves, and a former defence minister of Georgia is fighting with other Georgian volunteers for Ukraine. In a recent poll, more than two-thirds of Georgians believe that following the fall of Ukraine, Russia would target Georgia. Although the government has offered minimal humanitarian help in response to criticism, it has so far refused to join in on the penalties on Russia. a privately owned jet, has been cited in media publications.
Citizens worry that Georgia's EU membership hopes would be jeopardised by weak reasoning for the justified cautiousness. It was made clear by Prime Minister Irakli Gharibaschvili that sanctions have no purpose and that he alone is responsible for protecting Georgia's national interests in public. Tbilisi's ambassador to Ukraine was summoned back to Kiev after this incident occurred.
Shortly after Ukraine's application was filed, Georgia rushed in its own application for EU membership, initially scheduled to take effect in the year 2024. Its possibilities of success are less threatened by its stance toward Ukraine than by Georgia's strained relations with the European Union. Due to the delays in judicial reform and a lack of protection for minorities' rights, these have worsened in recent years. The prime minister openly toyed with the concept of a "illiberal democracy" of the Orban kind after the violent protests against journalists during the Pride Parade in the summer of 2021. A Western European view on Georgia's EU application doesn't see such mind games as beneficial.
However, despite the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the South Caucasus remains divided: Georgia is unwavering in its EU pursuit, Armenia stays firmly in Russian territory, and Azerbaijan is straddling both blocs. Three countries in the area have so far remained on their pre-existing growth pathways despite the war's effects.