Munich conference: will it be possible to avoid "dark times"?
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| [Munich Security Conference 2022] |
The fact that the turnout in the European Parliament elections held on May 23-26 in twenty-eight member states exceeded 50% for the first time in this millennium (50.94 percent - 8% higher than in the previous elections in 2014) indicates a return of the pan-European agenda in the focus of the majority of voters in the EU member countries. "The European Union is vital," the average voter in the member nations believes today, but the meanings and subtleties of this "importance" vary greatly, as indicated by the outcomes of the expression of will.
The election outcomes are such that the majority of participants may interpret them in a way that benefits them. Nobody has truly triumphed. Nobody suffered a severe loss. Additional coalition possibilities, previously unheard of in the EP, arose, although Eurosceptic, pro-Russian, anti-liberal groups' predictions of an imminent substantial breakthrough did not come true.
Europe hasn't entirely awakened, but the picture has gotten more difficult. First and foremost, the de facto "two-party system plus" has passed into history, with all critical decisions being made by a coalition of two main party groups: the center-right European People's Party (EPP) and the center-left Social Democratic Party. These two groups have always received an absolute majority, allowing them to set the agenda, make decisions, and distribute key political positions in European institutions, most notably the positions of President of the European Commission, President of the European Council, Head of the European Parliament, and Head of the European External Action Service.
In the previous European Parliament, the EPP had 221 members and the Social Democrats had 191, for a total of 412 deputies and an absolute majority of 751 people. According to preliminary election results (as of May 28, according to the EP's official website), the EPP will retain the position of the largest party group in the new European Parliament, but with a result of 180 deputies, while the Social Democrats, who will retain the second position, will receive 146 representatives.
The combination of the two factions results in 326 deputies (out of 751) who do not constitute a bipartisan majority. As a result, other "Euro-optimistic" factions will undoubtedly enter the fray: first, the ALDE liberals, who increased their representation from 67 to 109 deputies thanks, in particular, to the coalition of French President Macron joining them, becoming the third group in the EP; second, the "greens," who, having improved their results in many countries, became second after the CDU-CSU in Germany and now have 69 instead of 50 EP deputies.
The success of these forces has demonstrated the presence of a sizable public willingness to support a unified European political project, which is the polar opposite of the rise of the Eurosceptic side. At the same time, the success of the "greens" demonstrates popular desire for the modernization of the European project, its adaptation to human interests, particularly by conserving the environment and, in general, a human-friendly ecology.
Moderate Eurosceptics from the European Conservatives and Reformists party may also intervene in coalition discussions; they have lost a little ground (59 MPs instead of the prior 70), but they might claim a "golden share" under specific conditions. The foundation of this group is the Polish "Law and Justice" party, which, contrary to sociological predictions, has won a minor edge over the liberal "European Coalition" led by the Civic Platform.
The so-called "revolution" of anti-European/pro-Russian forces did not occur. Only in one nation has the ultra-performance right's improved significantly: Italy, where Matteo Salvini, the deputy prime minister and open Putin supporter, decisively grabbed the lead on this front of European politics from Marine Le Pen. Salvini's "League" party pushed yesterday's "people's favorite," the Five Star Movement, into third place in Italian politics, losing not only to its "junior" partner in the Eurosceptic government coalition, but also to the "status-quo" pro-European Democratic Party.
In France, Le Pen fared well as well, finishing one percent ahead of Macron's coalition, but her score is even significantly lower than in 2014. (22 deputies instead of 23). The far-right Freedom Party in the Netherlands was entirely defeated, with not a single mandate in the European Parliament (they still have a chance to get one mandate for their leader Geert Wilders after the British exit, when part of its seats will be distributed among other member countries).
After the publication of a video recording of "negotiations" between one of the party's leaders, Austrian Vice-Chancellor (at the time) Heinz-Christian Strache, and a "representative of the Russian oligarch" on the island of Ibiza in 2017, the Austrian ultra-right from Svoboda received a significantly lower than expected result (17 percent).
Due to the delay in the procedures for leaving the EU, the Brexit Party of the former initiator of leaving the EU, Nigel Farage (who promised to leave politics but changed his mind), won the Brexit Party, with the pro-European Liberal Democrats coming in second place.
As a result, instead of the usual "two-party plus" system in the newly elected European Parliament, there will be a true multi-party system, which will provide several options for a coalition at the same time, and there is no certainty that the representative of the EPP's largest party group, the German Christian Democrat Manfred Weber, will automatically receive the position of President of the European Commission, as previously predicted. Frans Timmermans, the head of the Dutch Social Democrats, is also unpopular. So, difficult inter-party discussions are ahead, which began on May 28 in Brussels with an informal dinner of the EU's leaders of state and government.
The 2019 European Parliament elections did not result in the dramatic rupture that many expected in recent years. The political forces who advocate for the expansion of the European integration project, rather than its contraction, gained a majority, but the composition of this majority will be more complicated than in earlier decades, when it was comprised of only two significant party groups. It is unclear if the European pendulum's swing toward imbalance has been exhausted or just slowed, but it is apparent that enormous social and political forces in Europe have awoken that do not agree with Europe's predicted demise as a political goal.
The "normalization" of the European political landscape and the halting of the anti-European momentum are mostly attributable to the fact that the two primary factors that caused the crisis have now been resolved: the economic slump and the 2015-2016 migratory "invasion." And, while no one can promise that similar crises will not reoccur, their importance has dropped dramatically worldwide, with the exception of those countries whose governing elites intentionally instill and nurture fear of migrants in society, namely Italy and Hungary. To some extent, the effective assault on the ultra-objectives right's is also owing to the activation of liberal Europe's "hard power," which had been lulled by decades of luxury.
The aforementioned Strache scandal (and it is a successful informational special operation with effective staging and provocation) indicates that, following Brexit and a number of stunning victories by anti-liberal forces, an informal "military wing" appears on Europe's liberal flank, which rejects the fight exclusively "in white gloves" and will employ the tools of hard realpolitik, particularly hard information technology. These forces appear to be actively exploiting one of the radicals' weaknesses: the low quality of their human resources, the existence among the radicals of a significant number of personalities with a low moral standard, and, as a result, their potential vulnerability to personal dishonor.
On the one hand, this demonstrates the willingness of certain forces in "old Europe" to "turn the cheek" and respond with blow for blow, especially after it became clear what manipulations with consciousness led to the "Brexit referendum" and what kind of "game with negative sum" (where all sides lose) it has become for both Britain and continental Europe; on what untruth Salvini-anti-immigrant Orban's rhetoric is based, with its manipulation of human fears.
The radicalization of liberals and the left in response to the rise of the ultra-right, on the other hand, indicates the polarization of Europe's political field, the simultaneous strengthening of irreconcilable flanks on both sides, and the subsidence of the political center, the main advantage of which is the promotion of values such as solidarity, cooperation, and "value-added games."
These elections have led many to feel that Europe needed not powerful combatants on opposing political sides, but intelligent "integrators" who can present a vision of the future that is acceptable to the majority while without embarrassing any of the parties (perhaps with the exception of irreconcilable radical destroyers ).
As a result, the biggest risk for the new European Parliament, and Europe's political field in general, in the coming years will be not so much the strengthening of the ultra-right and populists (which did not occur), but the simultaneous radicalization "at the poles" with the simultaneous weakening of the moderate political center, which will complicate achieving consensus there, where it is needed for effective policy implementation and confidence building. There will most likely be more ad hoc alliances for specific issues, more room for political maneuvering and negotiation, and less predictability.
In general, as a result of the May elections, the EU's highest legislative body adapted to the realities that had already emerged at the national level in many member countries: the diversification of the political field, the demise of old two-party systems, an increase in the number of political alternatives, and a certain radicalization on the flanks.
Ukraine's task is becoming more complex, necessitating higher competence and abilities based on consistent and rational adherence to its own political course, relying not only on diplomacy, but also on society with its values, interests, and creative resources, on a part of civil society well integrated into common European processes. society, as well as the Ukrainian diasporas throughout the EU.
This time, the reset of power in Ukraine coincides with the reset of EU institutions, creating conditions for mutually beneficial process synchronization if conducted correctly. Ahead is a game with a broad range of possible outcomes, including successes and failures.