Putin sees himself as the new Nixon, having turned Russia into a puppet of China. Beijing arrives at an opportune time for Putin's dispute with the West.
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| [Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping] |
Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to feel that by signing a "alliance pact" with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on February 4, he has accomplished something comparable to US President Richard Nixon's momentous visit to China in 1972.
However, just as the Soviet Union was the great loser in the 1972 Sino-American reconciliation, Russia is likely to be the big loser in the Putin-Xi agreement.
Nixon's visit to Mao Zedong was a watershed moment in Cold War history, influencing the course of the conflict more than the Cuban Missile Crisis. Relations between China and the Soviet Union were far more tense than most of the world, including most Americans, realized at the time.
The dramatic deterioration in ties between the two communist titans began in 1956, when Nikita Khrushchev separated himself from Stalin at the Communist Party's 20th Congress. This speech, as well as Khrushchev's de-Stalinization drive, infuriated Mao, who denounced it as revisionist, probably anticipating that he, too, would be shunned one day.
The Sino-Soviet schism in 1960 was caused by ideological and political disputes. Nine years later, Soviet and Chinese armies clashed along the Ussuri River near Manchuria. A larger conflict was just avoided.
Nixon's goal in going to China was to capitalize on the enmity between the world's two biggest communist nations. However, neither he nor his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, could have expected his triumph.
Faced with the horror of a two-front conflict against NATO in the west and a disgruntled China in the east, Leonid Brezhnev swiftly warmed to Kissinger's concept of US-USSR detente. He even went so far as to sign the Helsinki Accords, which allowed the West to oppose Soviet authoritarianism on human rights grounds. By the way, Kissinger deserves less credit for these accomplishments than he has often claimed; Nixon had supported for opening up to China before becoming president in 1969.
China is not looking for an equal partner
In any scenario, Putin may consider he has successfully replicated America's diplomatic coup. He appears to believe that by strengthening ties with China, he has secured an important partner in his struggle against the West.
However, China's estrangement from the US has been progressively deteriorating for almost a decade, a trend intensified by former US President Donald Trump and barely reversed by President Joe Biden. In the face of mounting anti-Western sentiment, China wanted Russia on its side, not the other way around - and certainly not as an equal partner.
Of course, despite its oft-repeated mantra that national sovereignty and territorial integrity are sacred, China now effectively backs Putin's military buildup along the Ukrainian border: it has urged the West to take Russia's "security needs" seriously and has stated its opposition to NATO expansion. However, this does not imply that China will side with Russia in a disagreement with the US and NATO.
Chinese support will be insufficient to keep Putin in power
Rather, Xi did what was required to pull Russia into vassalage with China. And Putin has gone right into his trap, believing that cooperation with Xi will aid him in his struggle with the West.
What could be better for China than a Russian economy cut off from the rest of the world? All of the natural gas that isn't going west to Europe might be flowing east to China, which is in desperate need of electricity. All Siberian mineral reserves, for which Russia required Western cash and know-how, would be accessible solely to China, as would major infrastructural projects in Russia.
Those who are still skeptical about Xi's irresponsibility in exploiting Russia's isolation need just consider the conduct of Xi's predecessors, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin.
Relations appeared to be cordial at first. In 2001, Putin signed a friendship pact with China. Faced with Russia's financial isolation, China offered a $6 billion loan in late 2004 to allow Russia's state-owned oil corporation Rosneft to fund the purchase of Yukos Oil Business's main production unit (a company that Putin's government effectively bankrupted in 2006).
However, in 2005, in what many felt was a direct result of the Yukos loan, China used its clout with Russia to persuade the Kremlin to surrender around 337 square kilometers of disputed areas in exchange for the withdrawal of China's other territorial claims.
China will not jeopardize its own wealth for Putin's sake
However, Putin appears to be oblivious to the reality that China's government and people regard Russia as a corrupt country that stole more Chinese land than any other country in the nineteenth century.
I observed their scorn firsthand two years ago when I boarded a boat over the Amur River from Blagoveshchensk, Russia, to the little Chinese village of Heihe. While selling cheap mobile phones and substandard faux furs, local Chinese shopkeepers openly insulted the Russians.
China will neither jeopardize its own wealth by publicly fighting the US in defense of Russia, nor will it support the Russian economy on a large enough scale to offset the heavy sanctions imposed by the West if Putin invades Ukraine.
Instead, China will do the absolute minimum to allow Russia to sustain its battle with the West, diverting Western focus away from China's geopolitical threat. This limited Chinese backing may be enough to retain Putin in the Kremlin, which is all that counts to him. However, the Kremlin dictator will lead a dwindling economy.
The author Nina L. Khrushcheva is Professor of International Affairs at The New School in New York.