The West's unity is largely surface, and the security conference's effect may be transitory.
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| [EU-US RELATIONS] |
The Munich Security Conference (MSC) has rarely taken place at a more politically volatile moment. While Russian forces took up positions around Ukraine, foreign and security policy intellectuals and officials convened in the Bavarian city. Although this meant that the nightly news could be accompanied by sound and vision from Munich on all channels on a regular basis, the news value remained poor. The crucial men and women had already reached an accord on the fundamental issue of how to respond to Russian aggression. As a result, the Security Conference was an appropriate and opportune venue for reiterating these sentiments.
Three parts of this year's conference remain. First and foremost, the West has re-united. The MSC's slogan two years ago was "Westlessness." Regarding Donald Trump, White House officials bemoaned the loss of the collective West's shared ground of values. That was out of date by 2022. After the inheritance dispute was resolved, the session seemed like a family reunion. The relief at having a common ground for conversation could be felt throughout the room; the nightmare with the "America First" hats had come to an end.
Second place goes to the all-male oval table, which was snapped during a business conference at the MSC. Although the entire conference was marked by pleasantly varied panels and nowhere could be found the musty, dusty atmosphere of an old boys' club, this group of mostly graying men in particular had an impression on social media.
The third item that stands out comes from the incoming Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock's statement. In it, she made it clear that the conflict's viewpoint needed to shift: "This is why this crisis – and we must be extremely cautious with the framing – is not a Ukraine problem." It is a crisis in Russia." In doing so, she shifted the attention away from a more regionally confined problem and onto a single player, as well as the basic challenge of preserving the rule-based international order.
This second concept, however, aligns well with the first feature, Western unity. Because it is simpler to achieve in the case of repelling Russia and highlighting the common ground of values than it is in the case of Ukraine's future. While financial, political, and economic sanctions against Russia are already in the works in response to Russia's force deployment surrounding Ukraine, it is still unclear how the country should be dealt with in the future. Some NATO allies are already delivering armaments and training Ukrainian forces, while others, notably Germany and France, have been attempting to reach an agreement until the very last minute. Later on in the agenda, one of the main grounds of conflict arose.
In doing so, he poked a still-smoldering hole in the alliance that has been open since the Bucharest summit in 2008. Because Ukraine's membership in NATO is a contentious issue inside the organization. There are significant grounds to oppose the country's entry, not the least of which is the conflict with Russia, the takeover of Crimea, and now the territories in Donetsk and Luhansk. Nonetheless, a sizable portion of the people in other NATO nations, such as Poland or Latvia, supports Ukraine's membership possibilities, although this is not an option in Germany or France.
As a result, the West's unity is largely surface, and the security conference's effect may be transitory. Because, in the effort to respond to the Russian Federation's recognition of separatist republics in Donetsk and Luhansk, which happened only one day after Munich, ancient gaps in the EU and NATO are resurfacing. The penalties package had been methodically crafted and was based on two assumptions, one expressed and one unspoken. The sanctions were written in such a way that they would take effect if Ukraine was invaded.
Many intelligence assessments that have subsequently been disseminated have pointed to such a scenario, and such a flagrant violation of international law would have elicited a strong and unmistakable response. The acknowledgment of the two breakaway regions, however, and the invasion of those areas are interpreted differently. On the one hand, as an invasion and hence a clear cause for punishment. On the other side, it is merely regarded as a recognition of truth - after all, these territories were not previously under the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian government. The underlying expectation was that an escalation would be avoided and that the circumstance in which sanctions would have to be imposed would never occur.
Putin's aggressiveness has shattered the laboriously earned unity. Because, just as Washington is hesitant to submit Russian oil supplies to sanctions – Russia is the third largest oil supplier to the United States – other actors are also attempting to keep their own nest dry.
In this perplexing circumstance, the German government has taken an unusually bold action by suspending the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline certification procedure. The country, which was previously viewed as an uneasy cannon in the Western ranks, has taken on leadership responsibilities and demonstrated that Chancellor Scholz is serious about establishing Europe as a foreign policy player. In this manner, he not only proves Germany's leadership responsibilities, which many at the Munich Security Conference requested repeatedly, but he also satisfies a popular yearning for the EU to be capable of global politics. This support for an active foreign policy and a significant role for the EU is reflected in the Security Radar 2022, which was developed by the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation.
This move also emphasizes that the unity celebrated at the Munich security conference must not have been everything, but that the conference's genuine slogan, "Unlearning Helplessness," must be the focus of efforts in the following years. Understanding the Union's strategic goals and the resources required to realize them is critical from a German and European standpoint.
The EU's strategic compass, which is being developed at the moment, can give preliminary information on this. However, they are only confessions. The aim over the next two years must be to support these with concrete plans and their implementation. Because nobody wanted to say it out loud in Munich, where they had just re-united so harmoniously: With the Trump administration, you peered into possible abysses for four years. Nobody can promise that it won't happen again. However, Europe must be able to make more autonomous decisions about its own security - to be strategically sovereign.
After all, who can imagine negotiating European security with Putin and a Trump-like American president in a few years? That would be a catastrophic combination of Westlessness and Helplessness.
The author Christos Katsioulis is the Director of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation's Regional Office for Cooperation and Peace in Vienna.