Journalists from the French daily LesEchos interviewed Thierry de Montbrial, president and founder of the French Institute of International Relations.
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| [AUKUS Alliance] |
What can we take away from the transatlantic conflict that erupted as a result of the new Aukus alliance?
This episode is instructive. Since at least Obama, American foreign policy has entered a new phase, for objective reasons: the necessity to "pivot" to Asia. Those who believed Joe Biden's victory would usher in a return to the good old days were mistaken. The White House is a little nicer, but it's still ruthless. What remains remarkable is the Atlantic Alliance's 40-year hiatus, which has lasted longer than any other period in American history.
From my perspective, the Atlantic Alliance's "brain death," as Macron puts it, began in 1991 [Editor's note: the breakup of the USSR]. Never before has an alliance lasted so long after its initial purpose had vanished. It was kept because we drove Europe's growth into the Atlantic framework, which Russia saw as a danger. Only "Euro-Atlantic institutions" exist for Americans. The European Union exists to serve the market. The submarine incident has shown the inconsistencies.
[Read More – AUKUS Alliance : China at gunpoint]
What conclusion should we reach?
We have the weight of our economy in foreign policy in the long run. To weigh, you'll need certain tools. To use De Gaulle's phrase, a country incapable of implementing economic changes cannot keep "its rank" permanently. As he desired in 1958, it is thus vital for France to reclaim control of its economic destiny. Otherwise, its standing in Europe will continue to deteriorate. We shall move from crisis to crisis if we do not reverse the tide.
Since the demise of the Soviet Union, our ability to operate freely in relation to the United States has gradually deteriorated. We must distinguish between sovereignty, which is a legal idea, and independence, which is defined as the ability to reject influences that push us in directions we do not wish to go. I think that a precise evaluation of the reality of our independence in interdependence, to use Edgar Faure's phrase, is required, both inside the European Union and within the Atlantic Alliance.
In specific terms, how should France defend itself against Aukus?
We must consider the basic foundations of our foreign policy, whose narrative (permanent member of the Security Council, nuclear weapons, etc.) hasn't altered much since General de Gaulle's time. We have no desire to abandon the Atlantic Coalition, but we do not want it to become an anti-China alliance. We can and must contribute to Indo-Pacific freedom of navigation, but the Atlantic Alliance is not designed for it.
We are certainly not on the same wavelength as the US and China, but French or European interests are not the same as American ones. In terms of security, the instability in our southern and eastern neighbors should be our first worry. The majority of our limited resources must be directed in these ways.
Since joining this alliance, the British, who are geographically in Europe, do not make this analysis?
For decades, a segment of the English public truly want to participate in the European game. However, Great Britain is an island that is drawn to the wide sea and English-speaking countries. Boris Johnson is attempting to recreate a portion of the unique connection between the United Kingdom and the United States. In Europe, the English have never felt fully at ease.
The most European of them never shared the goal of the European Union's founding fathers. Having said that, many shared interests, such as freedom of navigation, will remain. Aukus, a purely Anglo-American institution, is unnecessary.
What, in your opinion, should be Europe's foreign policy priority: clarifying its stance in respect to China, its Indo-Pacific strategy, or establishing strategic autonomy?
Strategic autonomy is more of a pipe dream than a reality at the moment. It slams into the Atlantic Alliance-affiliated Germans like a totem pole. In practice, we must first clearly define the strategic objectives that the European Union's members truly share, and then agree on priorities. The Poles and the French, for example, have opposing viewpoints.
So, will it be more China or the Indo-Pacific?
We should concentrate on the dangers posed by our neighborhood's volatility. It is true, however, that retaining freedom of navigation, for example, is critical. We can only provide a fraction of what the US can, and in exchange, we must shoulder more of the security burden on our flanks. The actual "burden sharing" that the US is looking for, not obedience to their viewpoints, should be this.
China, on the other hand, keeps returning to the same spot. The Germans have business interests in the area, and they will go to great lengths to safeguard them. They do the same thing with Russia. No European country wants to be dragged into a bloodbath with China. So, how do you deal with the American pressures? As a result, regaining some degree of action flexibility is critical.
Why not use the anti-Chinese approach employed by the United States? It poses a larger threat than the fading Soviet Union of the 1990s.
After World War II, the Soviet menace became a priority. Because the United States clearly did not want the European continent to come under Soviet domination, the Atlantic Alliance was a huge success. China is presently posing a completely different question. What is the current state of the Chinese threat to Europe? Europeans have a stake in defending their interests. To begin, you must first identify them. That does not need the formation of a military alliance. Later, everything will be determined by the circumstances.
But what if Southeast Asia's freedom of passage, and hence commerce, is jeopardized?
The North Atlantic Treaty's famous Article V stipulates that if one of the member nations is attacked, the others must do everything possible to protect it. Surreptitious power extension, on the other hand, is not an attack. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be of a very different kind, with far-reaching international ramifications. However, such a danger should not cause Europeans to depart from their geographically determined goals.
Yet this is the question that Theresa May asked Boris Johnson, after joining Aukus?
I've long believed that the Taiwan problem will be a big issue in the coming years. The Sino-American rivalry revolves around it. Europeans aren't very important - I'm not saying anything - in this regard. On the other hand, they must pay special attention to issues such as President Erdogan's foreign policy and Turkey's continued membership in the Atlantic Alliance. Let's take a closer look at what's on the outskirts of our world! The Gulf of Guinea, our southern frontier, North Africa, the Sahel... The Middle East is our south-eastern side. And, of course, our eastern side, i.e. the former Soviet Union.
We have a tremendous diplomatic and military history in France, but our resources are limited due to the status of our economy. Taiwan is not a security or defense priority from the standpoint of our capabilities. At the European level, we must determine what our true shared interests are with our partners. We need to go back to the beginning. And not to be vassalized by the United States, whose blunders in the Middle East over the last four decades have led to our deterioration.
Is Joe Biden a greater threat to global stability than Donald Trump?
The decision to withdraw from Afghanistan reflects the United States' exhaustion. They did it without consulting anyone and in a clumsy manner. Those that have long relied on the United States for their essential interests do so at their peril. Trump has the ability to accomplish anything. Biden is a lot more dependable. The American bulldozer is dead set on resolving the Chinese issue, and anything that gets in the way will be crushed.
A country's essential interests cannot be delegated to anybody. If he is trapped, he selects a guardian and, in this situation, accepts whatever the terms are. Is this where we've arrived? I don't think so. Should we give up on the dream of a less reliant Europe? Definitely not.
So, in order to recover diplomatic clout, France and Europe must bolster their economic clout?
France is become a major middle power. The new non-alignment means making the views of people who do not want to become vassals of the US or China known, even if we are plainly closer to the Americans in our situation. There are still some tasty leftovers. We, the French, and we, the Europeans, must promote our democratic and non-imperialist power paradigm if we, the French, and we, the Europeans, wish to assume the role of leader of the middle powers.
The submarine disaster might serve as a wake-up call. It challenges us to shed our naiveté about the United States. The industrial, diplomatic, and military traditions of France are still strong. The deterioration isn't unstoppable. Germans may also join the goal of a more European Europe, which, like Jean Monnet's, is based on incremental steps. Let us, on the other hand, exercise ambitious modesty!