Various South Asian governments might use the Taliban administration as a justification to repress government critics.
[kabul Airport chaos satellite image/RT]
Satellite images of Kabul Airport chaos
In Afghanistan, the Taliban have reclaimed control. The emotional exaggeration, which is occurring, is being understood and analyzed in the same way as the flow of events is being evaluated and studied. Concerns about the Taliban's probable victory have also been voiced in recent weeks. Some people wish to dismiss these worries by claiming that "this Taliban is not that Taliban," and that these fears are part of anti-Taliban propaganda. These explanations and concerns, on the other hand, deserve our attention.
One reason for the circumstances following the Taliban's triumph is that the Afghan people have chosen their own political power, rejecting foreign rule. The Taliban are interpreted in a nationalist manner. This view is true; nationalism is, of course, one of the roots of the Afghan people's support for the Taliban. It is unclear if this nationalism has been able to transcend Afghan society's ethnic divides. However, there are additional factors that contributed to the Taliban's triumph.
This nationalist perspective is incomplete because it ignores the topic of the Taliban's political nature. The Taliban have been in power for five years, yet little is known about the nature of the government they established. Those who perceive the Taliban's win as a "success for the Afghan people" over "foreign forces" should be aware that while the Taliban are undoubtedly a part of the Afghan people, they are not the only Taliban in Afghanistan.
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| [Kabul airport chaos satellite image/RT] |
Satellite images of Kabul Airport chaos
Afghanistan is not just open to Taliban supporters, but it is also open to people who are not Taliban supporters. The previous 20 years of governance in Kabul have been highlighted as an illustration of how remaining in power via force alone is impossible. But we must also recall the ferocity with which the Taliban is now battling its way into Kabul.
On the other side, those who support the Taliban from an intellectual standpoint and express joy, calling the Taliban's win the victory of Islam, are similarly prejudiced. The question is whether Taliban rule and Islamic law are the same thing; the contrast between Islam's past and the Taliban's created Emirate is clear. Anything done in the name of Islam will be in violation of Islamic law.
Concerns over Afghanistan's future and the Taliban's probable involvement should not be disregarded as a ruse to distort Western criticism, anti-Islamism, or Islamist politics. It is also necessary to identify any aspects of these worries that are incorrect or overstated. On the contrary, given Afghanistan's and the region's security and stability, it's critical to comprehend, discuss, and plan how to solve these problems. Those who sympathize with the Taliban outside of Afghanistan should be taken seriously, since there are signs of the Taliban's authority having an impact on the area.
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| [Kabul airport chaos satellite image/RT] |
Satellite images of Kabul Airport chaos
Concerns regarding the Taliban's authority in Afghanistan may be classified into three categories. First and foremost, what type of government will be implemented within the country. The second question is if Afghanistan would become a safe haven for foreign terrorist organizations. Third, if Afghanistan will become a regional security and stability danger.
When the Taliban were in control from 1996 to 2001, the people had no method of participating in the rule that they imposed. Citizens' basic human rights were not respected. The so-called code of behavior was imposed, women's basic rights were revoked, cultural activities were outlawed, the educational system was restricted, only religion-based education was granted educational status, and science was outlawed. These restrictions are being implemented under the guise of being typical of Islam and Afghan society. They enforce a single, definitive interpretation of Islam. The Taliban has refused to accept Islamic thought's variety, multidimensionality, or plurality.
The Taliban has refused to accept Islamic thought's variety, multidimensionality, or plurality. The Taliban has given no indication that they will relaunch them in Afghanistan. Is there any assurance that the Taliban leadership, despite their sincerity and dedication, will not impose such a system in various regions of the country?
Afghanistan was formerly a base and training area for al-Qaeda. Osama bin Laden left Sudan to Afghanistan in 1996, and al-Qaeda has carried out assaults on US objectives both inside and outside the country under his command. Despite the Taliban's assurances to the US, China, and Russia that such an organization will not be allowed in the future, Afghan analysts think the Taliban's link with al-Qaeda remains "intact."
"Afghanistan: The Taliban are occupying the whole country at an incredible pace, what is the source of their power," Asim Yousafzai, an international relations lecturer at the University of Maryland and an Afghan political and security analyst, told the BBC on August 13, 2012: "Afghanistan: The Taliban are occupying the whole country at an incredible pace, what is the source of their power," BBC, 13 August 2021).
It is possible for such groups to grow without the assistance of the government. If the Taliban tries to impose strict authority over the nation, there's no assurance that Islamic State or al-Qaeda won't construct strongholds to oppose them; this has happened in the past. At this point, it is uncertain what he will do after leaving the position. They are likely to be hesitant to collaborate in the same way they were previously. As a result, Afghanistan might become a safe haven for foreign terrorists if the Taliban are not supported. It would be unsurprising if the Taliban's most extreme members refuse to honor that commitment. These are the second issues that need to be addressed.
The third point of worry is the extent to which the governing Taliban's ideological impact in Afghanistan would be seen throughout South and Central Asia. No one forgets that the Harkatul Mujahideen (HUJI), a violent extremist organization based in Pakistan, was founded to help the anti-Soviet Mujahideen. Despite the fact that the organization was founded in 1986 under this name, it has a long history. By 1992, it had grown into a regional terrorist group. After the fall of Kabul, it began its formal voyage in Bangladesh on April 30, 1992.
The Taliban's triumph will enthuse followers of their philosophy. The Taliban have been able to attract adherents for their philosophy despite not being in power for the past 20 years. The Taliban in Pakistan, who have long aided the Taliban in Afghanistan, will be more powerful today, demanding the return of their assistance.
Another problem, which the worldwide campaigners are not addressing, should be highlighted as well. That is, it may be used as a pretext by many South Asian governments to crack down on government critics. The emergence of violent extremist organizations has been used by authoritarian governments in many South Asian nations to strengthen their authority and legitimize new types of repression. In the future, it is unlikely to be an exception. It's critical to keep an eye on what the Taliban are doing in Afghanistan, as well as what their ideologues are doing in the nation and what governments are doing under the guise of the Taliban.
In Afghanistan, the Taliban's victory has not resulted in a significant battle. That does not, however, imply that the days ahead will be without danger. Not only that, but the future roadmap is also hazy. This is not the first time in Afghanistan's history that such a perilous voyage has occurred, but it will provide no respite to the Afghan people or the international world. Only the Taliban's actions can predict which direction Afghanistan will go.
The author Ali Riaz is a Distinguished Professor at the Department of Politics and Government in Illinois State University Distinguished. He's also a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and president of the American Institute of Bangladesh Studies
[This article is translated from Prothom Alo]